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Abstract 
 
We explore the effect of political competition on the local provision of public goods in three 
countries: Brazil, Colombia and Mexico from 1991 to 2010 using municipal data. These 
countries share characteristics that make a comparative analysis useful in understanding the 
role of governance structures, which include the degree of fiscal and political 
decentralization. Based on a multidimensional approach of political competition and bringing 
to the fore the role of congressional elections, we establish the effect of several measures of 
political competition based on lower chamber elections on indicators of primary education, 
sanitation and infant mortality. We find that Brazil displays the highest elasticity with 
expected signs in several public goods to most measures of political competition, while 
Mexico shows strong connection of political competition indicators to all public goods but 
negative effects of voter turnout and electoral volatility; Colombia is the least responsive 
except for infant mortality. These differences are attributed to influences stemming from 
local accountability and party discipline. 
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Resumen 
 
En esta investigación exploramos el efecto de la competencia política sobre la provisión local 
de bienes públicos en tres países: Brasil, Colombia y México para el período 1991-2010 
usando datos municipales. Estos tres países comparten características que hacen el análisis 
comparativo especialmente útil en la comprensión del papel jugado por las estructuras de 
gobierno, las cuales incluyen el grado de descentralización económica y política. Basado en 
un enfoque multidimensional de la competencia política y destacando el papel de las 
elecciones de congreso, establecemos el efecto que ejercen diversas medidas de competencia 
política, basadas en las elecciones de cámara de representantes, sobre indicadores de 
educación primaria, sanidad y mortalidad infantil. Encontramos que Brasil exhibe la 
elasticidad más alta y con signos esperados en la provisión de los bienes públicos ante la 
mayoría de medidas  de competencia política, mientras que Méjico muestra una fuerte 
conexión entre estas medidas y todos los bienes públicos aunque con efectos negativos de la 
tasa de participación y volatilidad electoral.  Colombia es el país que más baja respuesta 
presenta, excepto por mortalidad infantil. Atribuimos estas diferencias a las influencias 
provenientes de la rendición de cuentas y la disciplina de los partidos.  
 
 
Palabras clave: Competencia política, Calidad de gobierno, bienes públicos locales, análisis 
comparativo, Brasil, Colombia, México 
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1. Introduction 
 
Political competition is considered to be the best way to improve the performance of 
governments in democratic settings. By encouraging the entry of political parties and 
empowering citizens to discipline politicians, Shumpeterian creative-destruction processes 
occur among political contesters. Thus strong political competition is associated with 
efficient provision of public goods, low rent-seeking and sustained economic growth. This is 
the Chicago School view, which has been influential in motivating political institutional 
reforms in the 1990s in several countries (Persson & Tabellini, 2003).  However, this sort of 
political reformism has brought about mixed results and some authors refer to it as electoral 
engineering, stressing the simplicity of the formulas yet simultaneously the complexity of 
such interventions (Norris, 2004). 
 
There exists a handful of theoretical and empirical studies on the role of political competition 
and governance quality, from which one can conclude that the relationship remains 
controversial.  For example, Acemoglu & Robinson (2006) and Lizzeri & Perssico (2005) 
analyze situations where more competition could bring negative welfare consequences.  
Empirical studies are more difficult to assess because of differences in the selected cases, 
data availability and econometric design.  
 
Despite differences in theoretical and empirical insights, these studies revolve, explicitly or 
implicitly, around the fact that the structure of institutions and the context in which political 
agents and citizens interact shape the extent and scope of political competition. In other 
words, differences in political results come from differences in the institutional environment.  
Comparative analysis offers a way for us to learn about this diversity and understand the 
political foundations of quality governance in a deeper way.  
 
In this study we select three countries: Brazil, Colombia and Mexico, and we track them from 
the 1990s to the 2000s in order to work out the following questions: how do political 
competition and the local provision of public goods relate to each other? What can we learn 
from a comparative perspective? We utilize comparative analysis insofar as it is an 
intermediate method between case studies and cross-country studies. While the former can 
turn too specific and hinder comparisons, the latter can be too general and overlook important 
contextual factors. 
 
The cases correspond to middle-income, developing countries with democracies under 
consolidation who have been involved in processes of political and economic opening since 
the 1990s and who have been motivated by similar governance issues (i.e. corruption, 
political closeness) and economic challenges (i.e. low competitiveness, regional disparities, 
inequality).  Scholars, particularly in Brazil and Mexico, have hotly discussed whether or not 
the increase in political competition since the 1990s have had positive impacts on the 
performance of local governments (i.e. Arvate, 2012; Cleary, 2007), providing us with 
suggestive reference points for this research.   
 
Our research design rests on three pillars. First, our theoretical view adopts a 
multidimensional approach to political competition and adapts it to the available electoral 
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data. Second, our contextual characterization of governance structure, local autonomy, fiscal 
resources and party systems also underpins hypotheses on the relationship between political 
competition and local provision of public goods. Third, our empirical approach uses 
municipal voter data on national Congress elections (i.e. lower chamber) instead of municipal 
elections, and compares performance over two periods (averages of six to ten years each) 
thus capturing medium to long-term trends.  Indirectly, analyzing municipalities allows us to 
substantiate discussions around local governance structures, decentralization effects and 
regional disparities. 
 
The paper continues as follows. In the second section we discuss the theoretical approaches 
to political competition and related empirical studies so that we are able to specify what we 
understand of political competition as well as discuss the approach we adopt. In section three 
we offer an overview of the political and economic characteristics of our three countries 
starting in the 1990s. Section four describes the municipal data set and presents descriptive 
statistics. Section five introduces the econometric specifications and the hypotheses to test, 
as well as discusses the main results. The tables from these sections are presented in the 
appendix.  Finally in section five we conclude and make propositions for future research.  
 
 
2. Approaches to political competition 
 
The political regimes considered in this work are democratic, which means that players are 
officially constrained by constitutions, divisions of power and regular elections. The nature 
and role of democratic political competition vary according to the approach taken, 
consequently we distinguish between three: the economic theory of politics, the transaction 
cost theory of politics and the multidimensional approach. 
 
2.1 The Chicago School and the Transaction Cost View 
 
Economists' understanding of political competition has closely followed the notion of 
economic competition  (Wittman, 1989; Becker, 1983; Stigler, 1972; Downs, 1957)  in which 
the underlying theoretical approach comes from the neoclassical school. When the ability of 
firms and consumers to influence the choice variable, that is price, is negligible, perfect 
competition holds. Consequently, no price discrimination exists, excessive profits dissipate 
(equal to zero) and consumer utility is maximized along with social welfare. Economic 
efficiency is reached even in the presence of externalities insofar as transaction-costs are 
sufficiently low enough for agents to bargain well-defined property rights and achieve better 
allocation (i.e. the Coase Theorem). 
 
In the same way that economic competition determines the ability of a firm to influence price, 
political competition shapes the ability of a political agent to influence public policy (Stigler, 
1972).  Political competition denotes a type of rivalry where no contender has strong 
dominance over the others. By virtue of this rivalry agents cater to voters more effectively, 
and reveal information on candidates' attributes and incumbents' performance.  Political 
pluralism lies at the heart of this concept conveying the idea of counterbalance among diverse 
social groups regarding governance (Dahl, 1989). The outcome of competitive interactions 
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among either interest-groups (Becker, 1983) or political parties (Wittman, 1989; Downs, 
1957) is maximum social welfare, which can be identified with efficient provision of public 
goods, low rent-seeking or sustained economic growth   (Besley, Persson & Sturm, 2010). 
As in perfect economic competition, perfect political competition directly stems from rational 
choice assumptions and full information scenarios, thus implying perfect commitment based 
on politician's promises. 
 
Political competition in this approach is mainly studied within the electoral arena and rests 
on a strong analogy based on market competition. This contrasts with the legislative and 
governmental arenas where agents appeal much more to bargaining and coordination than to 
intense rivalry. This focus on the electoral arena makes the terms electoral competition and 
political competition interchangeable in most of this literature, being a choice with no 
dismissive consequences because measures of political competition and associated public 
policies strongly revolve around the electoral process.  
 
The Chicago School was influential in the institutional reforms of the 1990s whereby many 
countries, developed and developing, modified electoral rules in order to encourage political 
competition or open up their political systems. This wave of reforms was seen as electoral 
engineering with mixed results; in cases such as New Zealand, larger political plurality 
improved democratic quality, while in Peru it diminished it (Persson & Tabellini, 2003). 
 
Drawing upon  Buchanan & Tullock (1962), North (1990) criticizes the neoclassical 
approach to politics for being an a-institutional analysis. He brings to the fore elements such 
as limited subjective models built by contenders, costly information and imperfect 
enforcement of agreements. The transaction cost theory of politics questions the instrumental 
rationality assumption implying that interest groups or political parties can fail to recognize 
or undertake Pareto-improving solutions. Precisely political institutions emerge as a response 
to these shortcomings as they are devices to elicit cooperation and reduce uncertainty among 
politicians, thereby creating a stable structure of exchange. Nonetheless, institutional devices 
do not totally overcome commitment and monitoring problems among principals and 
political agents. In this sense North (1990) highlights that political markets are inherently 
imperfect, however, he admits that political competition plays a critical role in diminishing 
enforcement and transaction costs. 
 
This transaction-cost view of political outcomes has greatly enriched the analysis by 
including legislative and governmental arenas (Dixit, 1996; Weingast, Marshall & Marshall, 
1988). Building a dynamic scenario that implicitly goes beyond the electoral process, the 
work of Besley & Coate (1998) and more recently Acemoglu (2003) also support the idea of 
pervasive political failures. These failures emerge from the interaction among perfectly 
rational agents unable to enforce future agreements that could be socially beneficial but 
individually damaging to some agents. The acknowledgement of imperfect political markets 
poses the question of how to make political markets less inefficient, or drive them to their 
"second best attainable-equilibrium," as Dixit (1996) puts it. 
 
Although the effects of higher political competition continue to be associated with desirable 
social outcomes (i.e. political transparency, public goods provision), reaching these heights 
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is a complex endeavor.  Acemoglu & Robinson (2006) highlight that the relationship between 
political competition and elites' willingness to block innovation and growth-enhancing 
reforms can be non-monotonic. They show that at very low or very high levels of political 
competition, measured as the inverse of incumbency advantage, elites promote economic 
development. However, intermediate degrees of competition may intensify political 
instability and hinder development because the adoption of technological innovations erodes 
the trembling power of political elites.  
 
Lizzeri & Persico (2005) show that more competition, given by the number of political 
parties, could imply lower provision of public goods, higher rent-seeking, expensive electoral 
processes and wasteful campaign contributions, thereby questioning the welfare effects of 
more political contesters. Based on empirical research, Collier (2008) finds that increasing 
electoral competition is not always desirable in cases of fragile democracies with resource 
curses, especially from oil, because it encourages wasteful electioneering and even violence. 
 
The two previous approaches refer to the notion of a political market and its efficiency which 
can be potentially enhanced through increasing political competition. Bartolini elaborates an 
alternative view in which the analogy between economics and politics is considered 
erroneous as it distorts the reality of the political world where “competitive interactions are 
a small island in the big sea of collusion” (2000, p. 63).  The author criticizes the economic 
theory of politics, reasoning that political competition has several dimensions whose parallel 
maximization is impossible. A more fruitful approach in his view is to identify the patterns 
of political competition structured by the mix of dimensions, and ascertain their historical 
circumstances, pursued values and systemic consequences. Because this last approach offers 
more comprehensive guidance to the comparative analysis we aim to carry out, we introduce 
it in the next section.  
 
2.2 The Multidimensional View 
 
According to Bartolini (2000; 1999) there are four types of interactions among autonomous 
players: competition, conflict, negotiation and cooperation. Competitive interaction takes 
place between independent actors that share the same goal and whose principle of action is 
individualistic. No strength or threat is used against the adversary to reach the prize which is 
repeatedly at stake. What makes competition so desirable are the unintended consequences 
of the race that benefit third parties (i.e. information, new technology, low prices). In contrast, 
conflictive interaction involves individualistic agents who perceive their goals as different 
and inflict damage on each other to win the prize. Cooperative interaction happens between 
agents that have solidaristic motivations and similar goals; this interaction encourages them 
to exchange and share the means necessary to gain benefits that can only be achieved through 
cooperation. In negotiation agents have collective concerns as well and each party controls 
some exchangeable prize valued by the others. However, their goals are divergent which lead 
them to use threats to achieve the best terms of exchange. 
 
Having said this, we define political competition in democracy more precisely as being a 
property of polities, associated with a system of interactions between consciously rivalrous 
and autonomous individuals and groups in the political sphere whose objective goal is 
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political power (i.e. votes, office, influence on policies). The means employed, such as 
campaigns and delivery of goods, among others, are non-violent, while the unintended 
consequence or positive externality of the race is political responsiveness.  Through the 
competitive struggle, parties or elites in power are obliged to take into account voters' 
preferences if they are to survive. The conditions necessary for competitive political 
interactions to produce responsiveness requires a careful analysis of how voters' preferences 
are formed, communicated to parties and aggregated, as well as an analysis of how the 
political outputs become contingent upon meeting such aggregated preferences. Bartolini 
(2000; 1999) departs from the neoclassical postulates about voter and party behavior by 
relaxing them a bit in order to empirically investigate four essential dimensions of 
competition that are able to tie elites' political choices to citizens' demands.  
 
These four dimensions are electoral contestability, electoral availability of voters, 
decidability of the electoral or policy offer, and electoral vulnerability of incumbents. The 
first dimension signals the openness of the political system to contestants, hence it focuses 
on the entry barriers, rules of representation and campaigning costs. The second dimension 
also refers to the openness of the political system but regarding voters. Electoral availability 
indicates a voter’s willingness to modify his/her party choice, a feature also identifiable as 
the elasticity of the vote. The response of voters before political offers comprises the act of 
voting and the act of choosing a party, both determined by instrumental and expressive 
considerations. 
 
Decidability of the political offer points to the differentiation between party platforms. It can 
be judged by comparing parties' choice of divisive or valence issues and the way these are 
communicated, clearly or not, to the electorate2. This dimension is more complex than the 
usual position of the party in the ideological spectrum because the political offer is the result 
of cooperative choices between contestants vis-à-vis the multiplicity of sites of political 
interaction (electoral, parliamentary and governmental). That is why parties wanting to seek 
office and pursue certain policies must engage in pre- and post-electoral coalition negotiation.  
Elites, interest groups and/or political parties make agreements that allow or restrain 
competition over key matters such as national security, regime endurance or patronage.  As 
a consequence political offers are not automatically aligned with voter preferences. 
 
The last dimension is incumbency vulnerability, defined as the possibility the incumbent 
government faces of being ousted and replaced by voters. A wealth of related literature has 
equated vulnerability with competition in line with the Downsonian models of competition, 
measured as closeness of electoral outcomes or uncertainty of electoral results. Due to 
significant vulnerability, the incumbent senses of lack of safety and their opponents use this 
to their advantage. Vulnerability contributes to responsiveness as long as there is clear 
governmental responsibility attributed to a party or an identifiable coalition, and the division 
line with the opposition is visible enough. Table 1 summarizes the four dimensions, the 
consequences of maximizing or minimizing each of them and possible measures. 
                                                 
2 A divisive issue involves “advocacy of government explicit actions from a set of alternatives over which a 
distribution of voter preferences is defined” (i.e. taxes or subsidies). A valence issue involves “the linking of 
the parties with some condition that is positively or negatively valued by the electorate” (i.e. abortion) 
(Bartolini, 2000, p.48).  
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Table 1. Dimensions of Political Competition 
Dimension Concept Maximum Minimum Possible Measures  
Contestabilit
y (parties/ 
candidates) 
 It signals the openness of the 
political system for 
contestants 
 Entry barriers to the race 
 Scope of representation 
 Campaigning conditions 
Excessive 
fragmentation 
No exit options 
for voters; 
closure 
(political 
monopoly) 
 Effective threshold of electoral systems 
 Fairness of representation 
 Information on regulatory barriers  
 Costs of party formation and campaigning  
Availability  
(voters) 
 It signals the openness of the 
political system for voters  
 Elasticity of the vote 
 Act of voting  
 Act of choosing a party 
Electoral 
instability 
Encapsulation of 
voters 
(including high 
abstention)  
 
 Turnover 
 Ex-ante electoral volatility (voting 
intentions) 
 Electoral cleavages; swing and core voters 
Decidability 
(political 
offer) 
 Differentiability of party’s 
platform 
 Party choice of divisive or 
valence issues stated clearly 
or in a blurred way 
Excessive 
polarization 
Shallow parties’ 
platform, 
political 
indifference  
 
Vulnerability  
(incumbent) 
 Possibility that the 
incumbent government is 
ousted or replaced by voters 
 Clear government 
responsibility and structured 
opposition  
Permanent 
campaign 
syndrome 
Safety of tenure, 
inability to 
sanction or 
reward (political 
monopoly) 
 Closeness of the electoral outcomes 
 Electoral risk  
Source: Authors based on Bartolini (1999, 2000) 
Borradores Departamento de Economía no. 56 
 
 
9 
 
 
 Bartolini (2000; 1999) notes that all dimensions influence each other in a non-linear or 
additive way, highlighting the trade-offs present. Contestability is a necessary condition of 
pluralism and is important for democracy. However, when it is maximized, political systems 
experience too much fragmentation as Lizzeri & Persico (2005) theoretically find and Collier 
(2008) empirically verifies. Low availability of voters reflects an encapsulated electorate or 
significant voter abstention, both indicating low sensitivity to adjustments in the political 
offer. Strong ethnic identities or poor electoral mobilization could be associated with either 
polarized parties or shallow political offers, both cases corresponding to high and low 
decidability respectively. On the other extreme high availability makes planning of the 
political offer difficult for parties and intensifies the incumbent's feeling of being unsafe.  
High vulnerability could bring a feeling of "permanent campaign syndrome" and stimulate 
delay in sensitive decision-making or intensify pork-barrel distribution. In response to high 
vulnerability, political parties can avoid taking stances on controversial issues in order to 
capture a broader electorate, which is a strategy that reduces decidability. 
 
Bühlmann & Zumbach (2011) develop an empirical application of Bartolini's view and build 
proxies of each dimension for thirty mature democracies to establish a typology of political 
competition. Their findings are modest partly because several of the proxies are questionable 
and also due to the high level of aggregation. Nonetheless, the authors confirm the 
complexity in their measurement as well as the richness of competition patterns. 
 
In sum, the multidimensionality approach underscores the fact that political competition is 
not a natural outcome of a polity but rather the result of collusive agreements between 
decisive actors. Political competition is desirable insofar as it brings about responsiveness 
but no unambiguous formula exists to maximize it. Instead a complete identification of the 
type of competition pattern that a democracy exhibits is essential to grasping the 
consequences of changes in the dimensions of political competition.  Table 2 briefly explains 
the three approaches identified.  
 
Borradores Departamento de Economía no. 56 
 
 
10 
 
 
Table 2. Theoretical Approaches to Democratic Political Competition  
Approach Assumptions on Democracy Political 
Competition 
Outcome of the Political Process 
Economic Theory of 
Politics (Wittman, 
1989; Becker, 1983; 
Stigler, 1972; 
Downs,1957) 
1. Arena: electoral 
2. Voter’s fixed and exogenous preferences 
(single-peaked) that maximize their welfare 
3. Office-seeking politicians/candidates that set 
policy platforms according to voters’ 
preferences 
4. Perfect information, if not, self-correcting 
dynamic mechanism   
5. Perfect commitment 
Intense: established 
from assumptions, 
it brings social 
efficiency  
 Spatial models: convergence of parties’ 
platforms; Medium Voter Theorem  
 Maximum social welfare 
 Efficiency of political markets 
 The Political Coase Theorem holds 
 No excessive rents accrue to politicians 
Transaction Cost 
Theory of Politics 
(Besley & Coate, 
1998; Dixit, 1996; 
North, 1990; 
Weingast & 
Marshall, 1988; 
Buchanan & Tullock, 
1962) 
1. Arena: electoral, legislative, governmental 
2. Costly information 
3. Subjective models of actors can be incomplete 
or wrong 
4. Imperfect enforcement of agreements 
5. Institutions as devices to reduce transaction 
costs 
Variable: it plays a 
critical role in 
reducing 
enforcement and 
transaction costs in 
politics 
 Political markets are inherently imperfect 
 No first-best Coasian-agreements are 
possible  
 The efficiency of the political market is 
measured by how close transaction costs 
are to zero 
 Positive rent-seeking 
Multidimensionality 
of Political 
Competition 
(Bartolini, 2000, 
1999) 
1. Arena: electoral, legislative, governmental 
2. Electoral contestability holds 
3. Voters’ interest in maximizing their 
preferences (not necessarily fixed or 
exogenous) holds but there is a varying degree 
of vote elasticity 
4. Politician’s interest in being re-elected holds, 
but decidability of the political offer is 
changing 
5. Varying electoral vulnerability of the 
incumbents  
Variable: it fosters 
responsiveness of 
politicians/elites to 
constituents’ 
demands.  
 
Not a natural 
outcome: 
continuous efforts 
to avoid it  
 The public good of authority is provided 
out of a combination of collusive and 
competitive interactions 
 Collusive politics determines the areas 
subject to political competition  
Source: Authors 
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2.3 Empirical Literature 
 
A selected revision of the literature will show us that studies have mechanically measured 
isolated dimensions of political competition. We start by referring to country and cross-
country studies, and continue examining works using within-country variation of our three 
Latin American countries. 
 
Besley et al. (2010) study the effect of political competition on pro-growth policies for the 
48 continental states of the USA in the period 1950-2001.  They find that the dominance of 
Democrats in the south was associated with fewer pro-business policies (e.g. higher tax 
revenue as a share of state personal income, lower infrastructure spending and lower 
probability that a state has a right-to-work law). The authors define political competition for 
a two-party scenario in which the vote share of the Democrats in states at time t is denoted 
𝑑𝑠𝑡. The lack of political competition is defined by the dominance of either party in state-
wide elections, then 𝐾𝑠𝑡 = −|𝑑𝑠𝑡 − 0.5| is the party-neutral measure. Higher values, those 
closer to zero, indicate stronger political competition. 
 
The electoral advantage of parties comes from core voters (or committed voters), while swing 
voters are not consequential in winning elections until both parties are almost symmetric 
rivals. The core voters are partisan voters (Democrat or Republican) whose utility depends 
upon non-economic issues and are courted by politicians through transfers. The swing voters 
are independent and make their choices based on economic concerns. Political competition 
increases when the advantage from partisan voters of either party declines, that is when 
candidates raise their substitutability (they have no ideological advantage over the contester) 
and/or the number of swing voters increases. In this way stronger political competition should 
make policy choices more pro-business and boost growth as it allocates resources away from 
low productivity sectors. 
 
Besley et al. (2010)’s work uses the first approach and provides evidence confirming the 
Chicago School view. The authors are cautious and warn that generalizations of their results 
apply only for the USA. In this two-party scenario, the model's prediction is that greater 
political competition improves economic policy (pro-growth policy, lower taxes). This effect 
is non-linear: at very low and very high levels of political competition, changes in this 
competition have smaller impacts on policy compared to intermediate levels. Low levels 
correspond to political monopoly (no contestation) whereas high levels correspond to parties 
regressing back to rent-seeking policies. At intermediate levels both parties adopt pro-growth 
policies which are the preferences of swing voters. Surprisingly, this non-linear effect of 
political competition is exactly the opposite identified by Acemoglu & Robinson (2006). 
 
Also strongly influenced by the economic theory of politics, Aidt & Eterovic (2011)  study 
the effect of political competition and electoral participation on fiscal outcomes of the central 
government in 18 Latin American countries over the period 1920-2000. The measure for 
political competition is mainly the Polity IV Index, a scale used to identify the political 
regime ranging from 10 for a mature democracy to -10 for a totalitarian regime. The index is 
based on formal, or institutionalized, regulations that manage contestability and openness for 
executive office recruitment, as well as executive constraints and electoral conditions 
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regulating political parties. Electoral participation is calculated as the aggregate voter turnout 
in general elections and referenda in proportion to the total population. These authors find 
that enhancing political competition limits the size of government making it more efficient, 
while electoral participation tends to increase the size of government because 
enfranchisement raises pressure for fiscal spending. 
 
We consider the Polity IV Index to not be an appropriate measure of political competition. 
First, if democracy is a necessary though not sufficient condition for political competition 
(Bartolini, 1999), then including autocratic periods as Aidt & Eterovic (2011) do confuses 
the concept of political competition. Second, because the Polity IV Index only includes 
formal rules, the informal rules intervening in the effectiveness of formal ones are ignored 
(i.e. distribution of power). Likewise the conceptual separation between political 
participation and political competition as independent variables is questionable, however 
these authors justify this due to the low correlation between indexes. Finally, control 
variables do not incorporate external influences on the size of government (i.e. expansion of 
spending after the Great Depression). Despite these limitations, these authors’ analysis does 
highlight the fact that different indicators associated with the political system could have 
offsetting effects. 
 
Studies about the effects of political competition on economic outcomes using state or 
municipal information from our three country set are scarce. We believe difficulties in 
building detailed databases are one of the main obstacles that researchers must surmount. 
The few articles to consider are Arvate (2013) for Brazil and Cleary ( 2007), Moreno-Jaimes 
(2007) for Mexico, and Sánchez & Pachón (2013) for Colombia3.  
 
This pioneering work on Mexico was inspired by the increase in competitiveness of mayoral 
elections and municipal responsibilities in public goods provision during the 1990s. Cleary 
(2007) and Moreno-Jaimes (2007) perform a similar exercise in which the dependent 
variables are sewer and water coverage in 2000, which are public utilities and the 
responsibility of municipalities. For the explanatory variables they include the lagged utility 
score in 1990, and as proxies of political competition, the 10-year average of the margin of 
electoral victory among the top two parties and the effective number of parties. They also 
include voter turnout, literacy rates and poverty as measures of political participation as well 
as other control variables such as municipal budget, population size, among others. 
 
Both authors estimate ordinary least squares (OLS) models on the log-odds ratio of sewer 
and water coverage, finding the dependent-lagged variable to be strongly significant, no 
significant effect of the margin of victory, and a significant and positive influence of voter 
turnout. They come to the intriguing conclusion that electoral competition does not promote 
government responsiveness but instead, political participation does. What matters is not 
political competition but direct pressure of politically mobilized citizens. We call this an 
intriguing conclusion because measures of electoral competition and voter turnout are two 
                                                 
3 Another related work is Eslava (2005) who focuses on Colombian social spending and voter behavior at the 
municipal level in order to find evidence on the political budget cycle for the period 1987-2000. Using a similar 
set of variables to Eslava, Boulding & Brown (2013) explore the effect of political competition on social 
spending in Brazilian municipalities in 1996 and 2005. 
Borradores Departamento de Economía no. 56 
 
 
13 
 
 
aspects of the same process: elections. Cleary (2007) offers a more complete discussion by 
questioning the appropriateness of applying the Chicago School view in the Mexican context 
and arguing that turnout is an indicator of non-electoral participation; likewise he suggests 
using a broader perspective when assessing the role elections play in government 
responsiveness. 
 
Arvate (2013), inspired by the work on Mexico, replicates the same exercise for Brazilian 
municipalities over the period 2000-2004 and found that political competition does increase 
sewer coverage. The statistically significant measure of political competition is the effective 
number of parties, while voter turnout is not significant in this study. An alternative proxy 
for public goods uses the provision of education and health measured by the number of 
student enrollments and the number of teachers in municipal elementary schools as well as 
the number of free immunizations in municipalities. In contrast to the studies on Mexico this 
author tackles endogeneity emerging from the relationship between the number of candidates 
and the supply of public goods by estimating a two stage least squares (2SLS) model. The 
instrumental variable (IV) for the effective number of candidates for mayor is the number of 
seats in the local legislative body conditioned by population size. Results confirm the positive 
and significant influence of the effective number of candidates on the number of primary 
school students and teachers, and free immunizations. 
 
Sánchez & Pachón (2013) examine de effect of local taxation efforts and political 
competition on public school enrollment and water coverage in Colombian municipalities 
using data over the period 1994-2009. In contrast with the above-mentioned scholars, who 
mainly draw upon political science literature, these authors are influenced by the literature 
on decentralization and governance.  As a result, they are interested in assessing the economic 
impact and efficiency of certain decentralization policies. They underscore the role of fiscal 
capacity sustaining that stronger local fiscal efforts are associated with higher political 
competition in the local level which leads to a better provision of local public goods.  Fiscal 
capacity here means the fiscal revenue locally raised (i.e. tax on property), distinguished from 
national transfers and royalties. Political competition is traditionally measured by the 
effective number of parties and an index of intra-party competition based on mayor elections. 
The main econometric estimations are OLS and 2SLS where the source of endogeneity is the 
local fiscal revenue instead of political competition. The instrumental variable is the cadastral 
undervaluation calculated through a logit model using municipal records on cadastral update 
and additional indicators of political competition. In short, they find that local tax revenue is 
positively and significantly related to the provision of education and water coverage, while 
local political competition has no significant effect. 
 
Results of these studies will be critically assessed vis-à-vis our results later on in section five. 
Overall the diversity of results drive us to examine political competition from a more 
comprehensive approach than the economic theory of politics. Next we will identify the 
specific patterns of political competition in our country set.     
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2.4 Applying the Multidimensional Approach  
 
We adapt Bartolini’s approach to our analysis in several ways. First, our measurement of 
political competition comes from electoral results leaving aside non-electoral features (i.e. 
campaigning rules, indicators of political bodies). Second, we group the four dimensions into 
two electoral dimensions.  The first aggregated dimension, called entry & exit dimension, 
brings contestability and vulnerability together because high values of the former usually 
implies high values of the latter. Furthermore, proxies such as the effective number of parties 
or the margin of victory exhibit positive and high correlations. The second aggregated 
dimension, called voter sensitivity to partisan agency, joins the availability of voters with the 
decidability of the political offer since electoral participation of voters frequently depends 
upon the ability of parties to differentiate themselves from each other and mobilize citizens. 
The proxy we use is voter turnout a variable that indirectly informs us about the decisiveness 
of the electoral debate.   
 
Additionally we build four indexes to assess the combined effect of the dimensions. The first 
is calculated by applying principal component analysis (PCA) to three indicators closely 
correlated: the effective number of parties, the sum and then the difference of the two main 
parties' vote share (enp, sumrank2, difrank2 respectively). This indicator is called pc_a and 
varies positively with political competition. The second index considers the interaction 
between enp and turnout, that is C_a=enp*turnout; its range of variation is [0, max(enp)] 
conveying that a larger number of effective parties with a low turnout downgrades political 
competition. The third indicator is given by:  C_b=C_a/EV, where EV stands for electoral 
volatility; it reassesses the stability of C_a dividing it by electoral volatility. In this way the 
higher the electoral volatility, the lower political competition is.  Electoral stability is not 
explicitly considered by Bartolini, but we believe it reflects an important feature of the 
interaction between parties and voters.   
 
Electoral volatility, measured ex-post, captures the stability of the relationship among voters 
and parties from one election to the next. According to Mainwaring & Zoco (2007) stable 
interparty competition, that is low electoral volatility, signals democratic maturity because 
voter-party linkages are based more on programmatic politics than particularistic and short-
run rewards. From this perspective, high EV indicates instability in party affiliations and 
possibly electioneering. However, we acknowledge that low EV in a developing-country 
scenario could signal political monopoly as well. In this sense, electoral stability that is too 
low or too high is undesirable for the same reasoning that is applied to the maximization of 
contestability and vulnerability.  Hence the fourth indicator is defined as  C_c=C_a/(|𝐸𝑉 −
𝐸𝑉̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒| + 1)│, where 𝐸𝑉̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 denotes the state’s mean EV.  
 
Table 3 summarizes the dimensions and measures we apply. Each dimension relates to the 
others in non-additive ways. Improvements in the entry & exit dimension are expected to 
reduce electoral stability, although its effect on voter sensitivity can be either positive (new 
inclusive parties mobilizing more voters) or negative (too much electioneering causing voter 
apathy). In sum, the multidimensional approach states that measuring political competition 
must take into account several dimensions and not only unidimensional measures such as 
electoral vulnerability.  
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Table 3. Three Dimensions of Electoral Political Competition 
Dimension Observable Measures Maximum Minimum Characteristics 
Entry & Exit  
 
Contestability 
& 
Electoral 
Vulnerability 
 Effective number of 
parties (ENP) 
 Inverse of the sum of the 
two main parties’ vote 
share (1/sumrank2) 
 Inverse of the difference 
of the two main parties’ 
vote share (1/difrank2) 
Fragmentation, 
coalitional 
politics and 
higher 
transaction costs 
in policymaking 
Political 
monopoly, 
concentration of 
electoral power 
 Given by historical patterns of party 
dominance, electoral rules and campaign 
costs 
 
 Partially shaped by electoral reforms 
Voter  
sensitivity of 
partisan 
agency  
Availability & 
Electoral 
Decidability 
 Turnout  
 
Ideological 
polarization; 
effective voter 
mobilization 
Blurred political 
offers, voter 
apathy 
 Reflect voter attitudes towards and 
inclusion in politics. Inform indirectly on 
the decisiveness of political debate 
 
 Not easily affected by policymaking 
 
Competition 
Indexes  
 Principal component 
indicator pc_a (ENP, 
1/sumrank2, 1/difrank2)   
 C_a=ENP*turnout 
 
Highly 
contested 
elections (by 
parties and 
voters) 
Electoral inertia, 
passivity 
 Signals the dynamism of political activity 
of parties and voters 
 It captures the aggregate effect of entry-
exit conditions and voter sensitivity  
Stability of 
Competition  
 C_b=C_a/EV 
 C_c=C_a/(|𝐸𝑉 −
𝐸𝑉̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒| + 1)│ 
 
EV: Electoral Volatility 
Stable electoral 
alliances 
between parties 
and voters. Low 
electoral risk 
Unstable 
allegiances; high 
electoral risk 
 
 
 Shows the degree of voter partisan 
identity and consistency in parties’ 
electoral strategies 
Source: Authors 
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2.5 The Role of Congressional Elections 
 
We change the focus from municipal results of local elections (i.e. mayor, local assembly, 
governor) to Congress elections (i.e. lower chamber).  Previous studies concentrate on the 
link between local politicians and performance of local governments, however, political 
agency at the national level (lower and upper chamber) also influences local social outcomes, 
such as education and health, through direct and indirect channels that deserve scholarly 
exploration.  
 
The direct channel involves bargaining over fiscal resources and other transfers that 
discretionally constrain or promote municipalities. Discretional transfers to localities lie in 
the competition dominion only accessible to congressional members and not to mayors who 
usually feel constrained by higher levels of authority. These transfers include spending on 
infrastructure, social programs or bureaucratic improvement which go to specific 
municipalities.  Deep regional disparities, especially between rural and urban localities, can 
find their roots in this channel. For example Lehoucq et al. (2005) underscore the sluggish 
rural development in Mexico as being a product of heavy concentration of fiscal spending in 
urban areas until 1997.4  
 
The indirect channel works through the party system (i.e. national or regional) which 
provides career incentives to local politicians. The promotion of mayors, governors or state 
deputies to higher levels of politics, or benefits awarded to local actions approved by the 
party, align local and national agendas. In this way, deputies and senators influence local 
politicians' performance through party affiliations. Certainly, for local voters, local 
representatives are more visible and closer to them than deputies and senators. Nonetheless 
members of Congress campaign based on territorial constituencies and frequently team up 
with local politicians building some degree of local accountability. 
 
From an institutional point of view local governments are nested within a governance 
structure that either allows or denies them possibilities (Ostrom, 2005). This means that 
operational outcomes in municipalities are determined not only by local political agents but 
also by the next level of authority where collective choice agreements are made. In this case, 
the collective choice level is made up of the state government, the federal/national Congress 
and the headquarters of main political parties.  While government decentralization 
determines the autonomy of municipal authority, the features of the party system establish 
the type of local political representation.   
 
Even though our focus is on the role of congressional elections in the local provision of public 
goods, we acknowledge that such provision is the outcome of several levels of political 
agency. This is especially true for social spending, for this is concurrently done between 
levels of government and is frequently earmarked in the Constitution. This new focus allows 
us to start examining the systemic political structure shaping political competitiveness and 
supporting decentralization outcomes. 
                                                 
4 The economic commissions in charge of discussing and approving the fiscal budget belong to the lower 
chamber in Colombia and México, whereas in Brazil both political houses participate in this process.   
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3.  A macro view 
 
This section provides a general characterization of our three countries regarding political 
regime, governance performance, party system, decentralization maturity, and economic 
development. These features underpin hypotheses on the effects of competitiveness in 
politics, and some of the channels connecting national politics with local governance. 
 
3.1 Political Structure and Government Decentralization 
 
Brazil inaugurated its democracy with the 1988 Constitution after decades of struggle with 
autocratic trends. Mexico experienced an ebbing of one-party politics and transited towards 
a more contested democracy in the mid-1990s, while Colombia embraced political reform 
with the 1991 Constitution, thus ending an era of two-party politics. The Polity IV Index of 
democracy from 1990 to 2010 registers a stable and healthy polity in Brazil, an increasingly 
democratic polity in Mexico and a downgraded democracy in Colombia after 1994 (Graph 
1)5.  
 
Graph 1.  
Authority Trends: Brazil, Colombia and Mexico (1990-2011)  
 
 
The three countries are presidential republics: Brazil and Mexico are federal and Colombia 
is unitary. All the countries have bicameral congresses that are elected proportionally or in 
combination with plurality voting. The Mexican electoral system stands out because it mixes 
plurality vote and proportional representation and defines a shorter term for deputies (three 
years) and a longer term for president (six years). According to population figures, as of 
                                                 
5 The index ranges from -10 to 10, 10 being a consolidated democracy. 
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2012, Brazil, Colombia and Mexico had 306, 181 and 160 habitants per congressman 
respectively (lower and upper houses combined, see Table 4). 
 
Table 4. Political Regime: Brazil, Colombia and Mexico  
  BRAZIL COLOMBIA MEXICO 
Government   
Federal 
Presidential 
Republic 
Unitary 
Presidential 
Republic 
Federal 
Presidential 
Republic 
Constitution (current) 1988 1991 1917 
Population (2012, millions) 181,753 47,704 100,679 
Area (2012, millions of 
km2) 8,516 1,142 1,973 
Compulsory voting Yes No Yes 
Habitants per congressman 306 181 160 
Lower House 
Chamber of Deputies 
(seats) 513 161 500 
MDM, electoral rule 19, PR 5, PR 16, PV* 
Term (years) 4 4 3 
Malapportionment (1999) 0.09 0.13 0.06 
Upper House 
Federal Senate (seats) 81 102 128 
MDM, electoral rule 3, PV  102, PR 4, PV 
Term (years) 8 4 6 
Malapportionment (1999) 0.4  - 0.23 
Presidency 
Electoral rule 
PV, second 
round PV, second round PV 
Term (years) 4 4 6 
Sources: Polity IV Project (2014), Keefer (2012), World Bank (2012), Banks et al. (2009), Snyder & 
Samuels (2004). MDM: mean district magnitude, PV: plurality voting, PR: proportional rule, MS: 
mixed system. Brazil: seats in lower chamber from 2007. Colombia: lower chamber has had166 seats 
since 2012 and had 100 seats in the Senate during 1994-2006. Mexico: lower chamber has 300 seats 
elected by plurality rule and 200 seats proportionally elected; the Senate has 96 seats elected by 
plurality rule and 32 seats proportionally elected (1994-2006). 
 
 
The Chamber of Deputies and the Senate rely on territorial constituencies in Brazil and 
Mexico but the Colombian Senate is nationally elected. However analysts have pointed out 
the heavy influence that regional votes have on Colombian senators' success (Jones, 2010). 
These congresses voice regional interests but exhibit significant malapportionment which 
over-represents rural states and landowner interests6. 
 
                                                 
6 Monaldi (2010) and Ames (2000) point this phenomena out in the Brazilian Congress. 
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Table 5 summarizes key features of the party system in these three countries. Brazil displays 
the highest number of effective legislative parties (7.8), followed by Colombia (5) and 
Mexico (2.7) for 2002/2005. The Brazilian Congress is not only the most fragmented but also 
the most polarized in terms of ideological views. Its Colombian counterpart appears to be the 
least polarized, implying that citizens and legislators do not perceive important differences 
in ideological partisan stances7. 
 
 
Table 5. Characteristics of the Party System: Brazil, Colombia and Mexico  
INDICATOR BRAZIL COLOMBIA MEXICO 
Effective number of legislative parties 
(2002/2005) 7.81 5 2.79 
Overall polarization (2002/2005) 2.84 0.6 1.74 
Institutionalization Index (2003/2005) 59 60 67 
Nationalization Index (2001) 7 7.3 10.5 
Centralization Index (2001/2005) 10.5 11.8 12 
Source: Jones (2010)    
 
According to Table 5, the Mexican party system is the most institutionalized, nationalized 
and centralized, while the party systems in Brazil and Colombia respond more to regional 
interests. The Institutionalization Index is built by considering party roots in society, 
programmatic contents and discipline. The Nationalization Index reflects the weight of 
national issues on legislators' careers and their ability to obtain wide electoral support across 
geographic units. 
 
In a less nationalized party system sub-national units are more important in legislative careers 
and national public policy is oriented towards local interests. On the contrary a national party 
system procures stronger alignment between national and sub-national politics in contrast to 
a regional party system which would face higher coordination costs and lower cohesion 
within the polity. Finally the Centralization Index measures the concentration of political 
parties' power at the national level. This index takes into account features associated to the 
electoral system, governors’ autonomy and intraparty democracy (Jones, 2010). 
Consequently, these indexes convey that Mexican Congress members have a stronger 
command over local politicians than their Brazilian and Colombian counterparts. 
Presumably, Brazil and Colombia face higher transaction costs in policymaking due to higher 
fragmentation and less political alignment among levels of government8. 
                                                 
7 The number of effective parties reveals the historical configuration of the party system, which is closely related 
to the incorporation of the labor movement into the political system during the twentieth century. According to 
Collier & Collier (2002), Brazil took a path of multiparty polarizing politics, Mexico a path of an integrative 
party system with one-party rule, while Colombia established a two-party system with electoral stability and 
social conflict. 
8 Nacif (2002) finds that “legislators in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies conform to the centralized party 
government model” (p. 256) and “the degree of party unity tends to be rather high with leaders controlling 
access to resources and opportunities within the legislature” (p. 282).  Also, Ames (2002) sustains that “given 
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In Mexico, the centralized party system and relatively low decentralization are both coherent. 
In spite of being a federal country, Mexico began the 1990s with a strongly centralized 
government structure, reflected in hierarchical budget procedures and large 
intergovernmental transfers on which the local governments rest. Since 2000, Mexico has 
exhibited a medium degree of decentralization that has advanced by adopting direct elections 
of governors and mayors who are, nonetheless, fiscally limited. For example, its sub-national 
spending as percentage of national spending reached 33% in 2004, which contrasts to 44% 
and 47% in Colombia and Brazil respectively (Table 6).  
 
Evidently, the most decentralized country is Brazil whose federal structure moved towards 
higher local autonomy early in the 1980s. Decentralization was deepened throughout the 
1990s to the point that since 2004, Brazil has had the highest index of decentralization 
maturity. It also exhibits the most coherent decentralization in reference to political 
decentralization, expenditure assignment, sub-national taxation, intergovernmental transfers, 
and sub-national debt management (Daughters & Harper, 2007). Colombia occupies second 
place in decentralization maturity with their transition having begun in the early 1990s.  
 
The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) of the World Bank offers us a first 
approximation to overall quality of these three democratic governments. The rankings in 
Table 7 are based on a total of 215 countries where a lower percentile indicates low capacity.  
Brazil occupies the best position in the average ranking of six dimensions over the period 
1996-2011, followed by Mexico and lastly Colombia. Brazilian citizens perceive that they 
have more freedom to participate in and express themselves openly about government (voice 
and accountability). In contrast, Mexico surpasses Brazil in terms of government 
effectiveness and regulatory quality which means they have better perceptions of the quality 
of public service, civil service and overall policymaking. Nonetheless, Mexico is closer to 
Colombia regarding controlling corruption and the rule of law.  
                                                 
the nation’s institutional structure, Brazil should be a prime example of conditional legislative parties, where 
leaders’ actions depend on the support of party members on a case-by-case basis and where influence flows 
from the bottom up” (p. 214).  
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Table 6. Sub-national Structure and Decentralization: Brazil, Colombia and 
Mexico 
INDICATOR BRAZIL COLOMBIA MEXICO 
States/Departments (2010/2011) 27 33 32 
Municipalities (2010/2011) 5,565 1,101 2,456 
Governor autonomy (2001) High Middle High 
Municipal  autonomy (2001) High High Low 
Decentralization Maturity Index (2004) 0.8-0.9 0.6-0.7  - 
Decentralization Maturity Index (1996) 0.6-0.7 0.5-0.6  - 
Expenditure decentralization % (2004) 47 44 33 
Expenditure decentralization % (1996) 45 38 25 
Vertical imbalance % (1995) 33 39 62 
Index of budget institutions (1980-1992) Low Middle High 
Sources: Mexico (INEGI, 2011); Brazil (IBGE, 2010); Colombia (DANE, 2010). Governor autonomy: high (1) represents 
governors who are directly elected and possess an important degree of political and administrative autonomy; middle (2) 
represents governors who are directly elected but have limited autonomy; low (3) represents governors who are designated. 
Municipal autonomy: measured by municipal government's percentage share of total government expenditures: low (1) 0-
5%, middle (2) 6-10%, high (3) 11% and higher (Jones, 2010). Decentralization Maturity Index: measures coherence in 
decentralization in reference to political decentralization, expenditure assignment, sub-national taxation, intergovernmental 
transfers, and sub-national debt management. Expenditure decentralization: sub-national spending as a percentage of 
national spending (Daughters & Harper, 2007). Vertical imbalance: intergovernmental transfers/sub-national total revenues 
(Stein, 1999).  Index of budget institutions: higher values indicate hierarchical procedures within budgetary procedures; low 
values indicate collegial procedures (Alesina et al., 1999) . 
 
Table 7. Worldwide Governance Indicators: Sub-national Structure and 
Decentralization: Brazil, Colombia and Mexico  
(percentile rank, 0-100) 
INDICATOR BRAZIL COLOMBIA MEXICO 
Voice and accountability 60.0 38.2 53.5 
Political stability, absence of 
violence 42.3 6.0 29.0 
Government effectiveness 55.3 52.2 61.5 
Regulatory quality 58.3 56.1 62.6 
Rule of law 44.5 33.2 36.5 
Control of corruption 57.7 47.8 47.5 
Average ranking  53.0 38.9 48.4 
Source: Kaufmann et al. (2012), average for 1996-2011. 
 
Colombia ranks low in political stability and absence of political violence with a position far 
below the Latin American and Caribbean average at the 40 percentile rank. The setback 
Colombia shows in Graph 1 relates to the internal conflict fueled by drug trafficking. As of 
2010 around 30% of its territory was outside the control of the central state authority. The 
presence of both right-wing paramilitaries and left-wing guerrillas brings about polity 
fragmentation and stimulates factionalism (Polity IV Project, 2010). 
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3.2 Economic Structure and Median Voters  
 
The Mexican economy is the richest in our country set (Table 8). Despite its relatively low 
social spending, Mexico displays lower poverty incidence and income inequality than Brazil 
and Colombia. This is partly explained by the performance of the Mexican economy which 
relies on a large service sector and export capacity thereby exhibiting the lowest 
unemployment rate. The second largest economy in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) 
per capita is Brazil with a stronger service sector and lower unemployment than Colombia. 
Even though Colombia shows a larger GDP export share than Brazil, its exports are mainly 
crude oil and minerals (accounted for by agricultural output), which explains the relatively 
high percentage of agricultural output as exports. 
 
Growth of GDP per capita has fluctuated similarly in the three countries. Colombia has the 
highest growth and lowest volatility on average, whereas Mexico fares as the most volatile, 
reflecting the domestic effects of the international crises in these two decades. Brazil and 
Colombia registered superior performances starting in 2000 relative to the 1990s; their per 
capita growth rates rose from 0.4% to 2.2% and from 1% to 2.2% respectively. In contrast, 
Mexico was the most dynamic economy during 1990s with an average growth rate of 1.9%, 
nonetheless this figure fell to 1% in the following decade (ECLAC, 2014).  
 
Since the mid-1980s most countries in Latin America have increased social expenditures 
(e.g. education, health, water, sanitation, housing, subsidies, social security) as a 
consequence of political democratization (Cárdenas & Perry, 2011). Table 6 presents figures 
of social spending and associated indicators. On average from 1990 to 2012, Brazil's social 
spending reached 21% of its GDP, followed by Colombia with 11% and Mexico with 8.6%. 
During this period Brazil raised its spending on education, health, housing and, notoriously, 
on social security. At the same time, Brazil is the economy with the largest tax revenue as a 
share of GDP. 
 
These comparisons highlight important features. In the 1990s Brazil began a stable 
democratic era supported by more decentralization and civil participation. Colombia also 
intended to deepen democracy through decentralization and higher social spending but the 
internal conflict and the crisis in the political system have seriously hindered the quality of 
its governance. Also, unemployment is by far the largest suggesting market rigidities among 
other hurdles. As a result median voters in both Colombia and Brazil earn low incomes, but 
the median voter in Brazil faces unemployment and homicide violence with less probability. 
The Brazilian median voter also voices much more of their demands, pays more taxes and 
has increasingly been receiving social spending (especially social security). Yet this voter 
could feel as frustrated as their Colombian counterpart for the relatively low level of 
government effectiveness and regulatory quality. 
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Table 8. Economic Indicators Economic Indicators: Brazil, Colombia and Mexico 
(average 1990-2012) 
INDICATOR BRAZIL COLOMBIA MEXICO 
Output & Employment 
GDP p/c (2005 USD) 4,632 3,337 7,255 
GDP p/c  growth (%) 1.34 1.93 1.41 
GDP p/c  state dev. growth (%) 2.77 2.36 3.06 
Agriculture output (% GDP)  6.3 11.1 4.8 
Industry output (% GDP)  30.1 33.0 30.0 
Service output (% GDP)  63.5 55.8 64.1 
Exports (% GDP) 11.1 16.7 26.4 
Employment (% total population) 62.48 56.4 58.97 
Unemployment (% total labor force) 7.84 12.11 3.8 
Informality (% productive) 56.81 61.05 49.95 
Informality (% legal) 34.6 51.1 59.4 
Fiscal Revenue (% of GDP) 
Non-tax  (general government) 4.4 10.8 12.1 
Tax (general government) 30.3 14.3 9.4 
Social Spending (% of GDP)*  
Total 20.9 11 8.6 
Education 4.6 3.3 3.4 
Health 3.9 2.0 2.4 
Social security 11.2 5.0 1.7 
Housing and others 1.2 0.7 1.1 
Education & Health 
High education (% adult population) 9.84 14.4 13.62 
Middle education (% adult population) 23.8 32.02 32.06 
Low education (% adult population) 66.3 53.52 54.3 
Infant mortality (% per 1,000 live 
births) 35 25 30 
Poverty & Safety 
% Population living with or less than 
US$1.25 a day 11.13 13.4 3.95 
GINI Index 58.41 57.02 49.34 
IDH Index** 0.69 0.68 0.74 
Intentional homicides (% per 100,000 
people) 3.3 4.8 2.5 
Sources: World Bank Development Indicators, CEDLAS,*ECLAC,**UNDP. 
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Mexico embraced political openness during the 1990s but has assimilated decentralization 
trends in a slow way; hence the Mexican voter encounters more government hierarchy when 
voicing demands. This median voter is not as poor as their two counterparts, pays fewer taxes 
and faces informality (absence of social security) with higher incidence. This voter is 
discouraged by weak rule of law (perception of high corruption), and is probably more 
sensitive to trade policy and international market fluctuations. 
  
4. Municipal data and descriptive statistics 
 
Data on public goods provision and other socio-economic indicators for municipalities cover 
the period 1990-2010. Because data availability changes across countries according to 
censuses, we make two averages for all variables, one for each period within each country, 
in order to maintain comparability between them as much as possible. These periods for 
Brazil: 1991-2000 and 2001-2010; for Colombia: 1998-2005 and 2006-2011; and for 
Mexico: 1995-2005 and 2006-2010. Tables A.1.1 to A.1.3 in Appendix documents data 
sources and other calculations.  
 
The electoral data corresponds to lower chamber elections of federal deputies from 1994 to 
2010. As before, we define two averages of electoral indicators for each period within each 
country: Brazil for 1994-1998 and 2002-2010; Colombia for 1998-2002 and 2006-2010; and 
Mexico for 1994-2003 and 2006-2009. By using these averages we work with ex-ante 
measures of political competition as well as political trends instead of short-run electoral 
phenomena to contrast government performance between periods9. 
 
The public goods considered are sewer and water coverage, infant mortality rate (proxy), 
gross rate of primary education, and the student-teacher ratio in primary education. Municipal 
governments in our three countries are the main authority in charge of investment and 
implementation policies in regard to these public goods10.   
 
Descriptive statistics of this dataset are shown in Tables A.2.1 to A.2.3 in the Appendix.  
Brazil registers the greatest improvement in all mean indicators of these goods from 1990 to 
2010. Mexico also reports gains in these indicators although of a lower order than Brazil, 
while Colombia displays little advancement in the gross rate of primary education and infant 
mortality but slight setbacks in water and sewer coverage. Clearly, differences in governance 
performance reflect differences in fiscal resources and political incentives faced by 
municipalities in each country. 
 
Fiscal variables are per capita municipal revenue, share of municipal transfers in current 
revenue and share of urban property tax revenue in total tax revenue. A limitation in 
municipal fiscal data is the high aggregation of revenues and expenditures especially in 
Mexico. Brazil is the exception although several changes in fiscal accounting procedures 
                                                 
9 An ex-ante measure means that to establish the effect of elections on governance performance in period t, 
elections in t-1 are considered.  
10 This provision must be publicly regulated but not necessarily publicly provided. There could be private 
operators as it is the case of water coverage in Colombia since 1994. Nonetheless, the share of private operators 
is lower than that of municipal governments (Sanchez & Pachón, 2013).   
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have lessened its comparability over time. As a consequence we cannot observe expenditures 
on health, education or infrastructure but only as total social spending or total transfers. All 
monetary variables are transformed into international dollars for comparison purposes.  
 
Our fiscal indicators show that average per capita municipal revenue is substantially higher 
in Brazil, intermediate in Colombia and low in Mexico. Transfers to municipalities as a 
percentage of current revenue are nearly 90% in Brazil and Mexico, whereas this figure is 
80% in Colombia. The share of tax from urban property, within total tax revenues, largely 
varies: from 20-15% in Brazil, to 49-40% in Colombia and 78-76% in Mexico. Brazilian 
municipalities directly manage more taxes in comparison to Colombian and Mexican 
municipalities who heavily depend on this tax (CEFP, 2005; Souza, 2002).    
 
Despite country differences, an historical consensus shared by the region has focused on 
increasing both social spending and fiscal transfers to municipalities. Brazilian municipalities 
have progressively been given fiscal responsibilities, and have also received tax revenues, 
fiscal incentives and federal transfers since 1989. An important percentage of federal and 
state transfers were devoted to education and health thus improving indicators of primary 
education and health, but allocating less resources to sewer and water coverage as well as 
infrastructure investment (Afonso, 2007). 
 
Since 1991, decentralization in Colombia has increased national transfers to municipalities 
but has also earmarked social spending, limiting the discretion capabilities of local 
governments. Alesina, Carrasquilla & Echavarría (2002) diagnosed that spending in 
education and health did not improve indicators in these areas and simultaneously expanded 
the national fiscal deficit. Fiscal reforms followed in 2001 and 2007 that better defined 
responsibilities and incentives for local governments. They kept the focus on social spending 
by establishing that 58.5% and 24.5% of national transfers must be invested in education and 
health respectively, while only 5.4% was earmarked for sewer and water coverage (Gobierno 
Nacional, 2007; 2002). 
 
Reforms aiming to promote municipal autonomy in Mexico took place in 1993, 1999 and 
2007. Through these reforms municipalities increased their revenues and enhanced their 
management capacity. However analysts highlight the high concentration of fiscal spending 
at the centralized level as well as the transfer dependency of municipalities (Peña & 
Bojórquez, 2012; López González, 2004). An important share of these transfers has been 
dedicated to social infrastructure, including sewer and water coverage, through special funds 
(i.e. Fondo de Aportaciones para la Infraestructura social municipal [FASIM], Fondo de 
Aportaciones para la Infraestructura social [FAIS]). This fact explains the wider coverage 
in water and sewer in Mexico relative to Brazil and Colombia. 
 
The indicators of political competition we use are: difference of the two main parties' vote 
share, effective number of parties (enp), turnout, and composite indicators: pc_a, C_a, C_b, 
C_c (see Table 3).  According to Tables A.2.1 to A.2.3 the entry of new significant parties 
increased from the first to the second period in all countries: from 3.1 to 4 in Brazil, 2.6 to 
3.3 in Colombia and 2.4 to 2.8 in Mexico. Also the sums and differences of the first two 
parties’ vote share went down, signaling higher political contestability and vulnerability 
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(entry & exit dimension). Brazil shows the highest and most stable turnout of 74% on 
average, Colombia has the lowest (40-45%) and Mexico registers a decrease in voter turnout 
(58-52%). Consequently competition indexes pc_a and C_a rise in all cases: Brazil has the 
highest C_a index (2.3 to 3), followed by Mexico (1.37 to 1.46) and Colombia (1.07 to 1.51).  
Appendix contains maps of the index C_a in order to illustrate its geographical distribution 
in municipalities of each country and its change between periods.   
 
In terms of stability of electoral competition, Brazil exhibits relatively high electoral 
volatility (34% and 42%), Mexico doubles theirs between periods (21% to 41%) and that of 
Colombia increases around 60% going from 27% to 44%.  Index C_b rises in Brazil (5.9 to 
9.1), decreases a little in Colombia (4.7 to 4) and overtly goes down in Mexico (6.8 to 3.75).  
According to this index, stability in political competition grows in Brazil, stays more or less 
the same in Colombia and definitely diminishes in Mexico. In contrast, index C_c slightly 
rises in all countries as it closely follows index C_a: from 2.1 to 2.7 in Brazil, 1.1 to 1.4 in 
Colombia and 1.2 to 1.4 in Mexico. The behavior of C_c indicates that electoral volatility 
tended to increase uniformly within states11. Because index C_b displays a more interesting 
distribution, Appendix presents maps of it. 
 
We use two sets of controls: basic and all. The former set includes state dummies and the 
logarithm of: per capita GDP (Mexico, Brazil), non-residential consumption of Kw per capita 
(Colombia), population and demographic density. The latter set contains basic controls plus 
population growth, index of human development and five clusters based on the median of 
population and per capita GDP (or its proxy) over the period 1993-2010.   
 
The GDP per capita in levels reveal Brazilian municipalities as richer local economies in 
comparison to Mexico’s. Unfortunately Colombia does not have figures for this variable, this 
being a strong limitation for country comparisons; however, we use nonresidential 
consumption of electric energy as a proxy for economic activity in municipalities. 
 
 
5. Specification models and hypotheses 
  
In the analysis, we investigate the relationship between competition in lower chamber 
elections and the provision of public goods in municipalities. Our relationship of interest is 
expressed as 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑓(𝐺𝑖, 𝑋𝑖), where 𝑦𝑖 is the provision of the public good in municipality i, 
𝐺𝑖 denotes government effectiveness and 𝑿𝑖  a vector of characteristics. Government 
effectiveness, based on the Worldwide Governance Indicators, refers to the quality of public 
and civil services, as well as the quality of policy formulation and implementation. In turn, 
𝐺𝑖 is a function of the responsiveness of political agency to constituents' demands and fiscal 
resources in the municipality. From a multidimensional view of political competition, 
political responsiveness is positively associated with political competition. Thus 𝐺𝑖 =
𝑔(𝐶𝑖, 𝐹𝑖), where 𝐶𝑖 stands for political competition and 𝐹𝑖 for fiscal resources in municipality 
i.  
 
                                                 
11 "Departments" in Colombia are akin to "federal states" in Brazil and Mexico.  
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Consequently 𝑦𝑖 = ℎ(𝐶𝑖, 𝐹𝑖 𝑋𝑖) where function h can take several forms.  In empirically 
identifying this relationship three main challenges emerge: specification form, unobserved 
individual effects and simultaneity. First, we have no certainty whether the specification form 
follows a lineal model. Yet, we start by exploring lineal relationships by using all variables 
in levels and logarithms. The log-odds ratio is applied to public goods such as sewer coverage 
or child mortality whose measure ranges between zero and one in order to correctly perform 
linear regressions.12 
 
Second, the government responsiveness, or government quality, is not perfectly observed. In 
terms of data panel, this means that there are unobserved individual effects related to the 
ability of governments to deliver public goods. In consequence, we perform fixed and random 
effects models for panel, and explore the Hausman & Taylor estimator which corrects for 
this kind of endogeneity in random effects models.  This paper reports results from tackling 
the first and second challenge.  
 
Third, municipalities with better provision of public goods could be more attractive for 
parties and candidates because they represent better career perspectives and have wealthier 
and more educated voters that support them.  Simultaneity between government quality and 
the provision of public goods brings about endogeneity and the need to find instrumental 
variables to make correct inferences. We are working on this matter and will report these 
results soon13.  
 
The baseline for cross-section specifications is: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝐲′𝑖𝑡−1𝛽0 + 𝑪′𝑖𝑡𝛽1 + 𝑭′𝑖𝑡𝛽2 + 𝑿′𝑖𝑡Ψ + 𝑢𝑖𝑡    (1) 
 
Where i=1,..., n and  t=1,2. The lagged term captures the path-dependence of public good 
provision, especially for public utilities; Ψ is a column vector of parameters associated 
with 𝑿𝑖, and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is the random term
14.  
 
The baseline for fixed and random effects panel specifications is respectively: 
 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑪′𝑖𝑡𝛽1 + 𝑭′𝑖𝑡𝛽2 + 𝑿′𝑖𝑡Ψ + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡     (2) 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑪′𝑖𝑡𝛽1 + 𝑭′𝑖𝑡𝛽2 + 𝑿′𝑖𝑡Ψ + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡  where  𝑣𝑖𝑡 = 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡  (3)  
 
The term 𝑐𝑖 represents the unobserved individual effect which is a random variable.  While 
the fixed effects model assumes that  𝐶𝑜𝑣 = (𝑪𝑖𝑡, 𝑭𝑖𝑡, 𝑿𝑖𝑡 , 𝑐𝑖) ≠ 0 and eliminates the 
                                                 
12 The transformation for 𝑦𝑖  is ln (𝑦𝑖/(1 − 𝑦𝑖)). To calculate the predicted values as percentages we apply the 
formula 𝑦 = exp (𝑦)̂/(1 + exp(?̂?)). 
13 Likewise the relationship between fiscal resources and dimensions of political competition such as the 
effective number of parties can be ambiguous. On one side, a large number of resources could induce the entry 
of fewer parties because incumbents establish strong ties with the electorate thus reducing entrants' chances of 
victory. Evidence for Brazil using mayoral elections points in this direction (Boulding & Brown, 2013). 
Alternatively, the large pool of resources could induce party entry because of the high political stakes. On the 
other side, scarce resources may discourage competition too for career incentives are few for politicians. 
14 The differences in differences model was also explored: ∆𝑦𝑖 = ∆𝑪𝑖𝛽1 + ∆𝑭𝑖𝛽2 + ∆𝑿𝑖Ψ + 𝑢𝑖 
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unobserved individual effect by using the within-groups estimator, the random effects model 
assumes that this covariance is equal to cero and tackles the serial correlation by using the 
GLS estimator (Wooldridge, 2002). 
 
The model for the Hausman & Taylor estimator is,   
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑪′𝑖𝑡𝛽1 + 𝑭′𝑖𝑡𝛽2 + 𝑿′𝑖𝑡Ψ + 𝒁′1𝑖𝑡𝛼1 + 𝒁′2𝑖𝑡𝛼2 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡  (4) 
 
Where  𝒁′1𝑖𝑡 and 𝒁′2𝑖𝑡 are time-invariant variables such that 𝐸(c𝑖│𝑿𝑖𝑡, 𝒁1𝑖𝑡) = 0 and 
𝐸(c𝑖│𝑪𝑖𝑡, 𝑭𝑖𝑡, 𝒁2𝑖𝑡) ≠ 0.  This model allows for correlation between the unobserved 
individual effect and some of the independent variables, making it less sensitive to the 
ignorance about  𝑐𝑖. It is also appropriate when there are time-invariant variables correlated 
with the unobserved heterogeneity (Greene, 2012).  In our exercise, variables in 𝒁1𝑖𝑡, that is 
exogenous ones, correspond to the logarithm of population and demographic density, and 
dummy variables by states (time-invariant). Variables in 𝒁2𝑖𝑡, or endogenous ones,  are the 
log of the political competition indicator and either one of our three fiscal variables or the 
log of GDP per capita. This last set also includes a time-invariant variable built on five 
clusters drawing upon the Anselin Local Moran’s I statistic based on turnout (median over 
1994-2010).  We call this variable cotype2 and employ it under the basic intuition that 
clusterization of municipalities according to voter participation conveys information about 
the quality of government.  Nonetheless we do not have a prior about the direction of the 
effect15.    
 
The hypotheses to assess are: 
 
Hypothesis 1 (political responsiveness): Stronger political competition in lower chamber 
elections is positively associated with the local provision of public goods. This means that 
0 < 𝛽1 for public goods whose provision increases with its measure (i.e. water and sewer 
coverage, primary education rate) and  0 > 𝛽1  otherwise (i.e. infant mortality, student-
teacher ratio)16. 
 
Hypothesis 2 (local accountability): The more advanced government decentralization, the 
stronger the influence of political competition in Congress elections over 𝑦𝑖. This is because 
Congress members are closer to their local constituents.  Brazil could exhibit greater 
significance of 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 via this channel. 
 
Hypothesis 3 (party discipline): The higher the degree of nationalization of the party 
system, the larger the influence of Congress elections over 𝑦𝑖. This occurs because national 
                                                 
15 The Local Moran’s I statistic measures the spatial association between geographical entities identifying 
clusters of features with values similar in magnitude. Calculations were based on the Euclidean distance. Our 
variable cotype2 reflects the 1:1 correspondence of the set of clusters given by {Not significant, LL, LH, HL, 
HH} with the following set of numbers {1,2,3,4,5}.  
16 Larger provision means wider sewage and water coverage, higher primary education rates or more years of 
education in the population older than 15 years, lower infant mortality rates, and lower student-teacher ratio in 
primary education. 
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and local politicians align their agendas when parties are centralized. By this channel, 𝛽1 
coefficients for Mexico could reach significance, although their signs cannot be predicted. 
 
Hypothesis 2 and 3 underscores two main channels of the influence of national politics over 
local politics. The former refers to government decentralization which, in theory, would 
strengthen localities’ capacities and orientate national politicians to serve local demands. 
Nevertheless such alignment between national and local politicians cannot be taken for 
granted insofar as local or national politicians could have own agendas in which their 
constituencies rank very lowly thereby making political responsiveness costly and slow-
moving.  Hypothesis 3 assumes that party discipline, expressed through its degree of 
nationalization, induces coordination between local and national politicians, however, such 
coordination does not necessarily conduce to stronger political responsiveness as party 
discipline can also service welfare-diminishing practices (i.e. neglect of community’s needs, 
clientelism). Thus hypothesis 3 only states that Mexico could provide statistical evidence of 
the effects of political competition via this channel, although they could be positive or 
negative.  
 
Hypothesis 4 (size of municipality): Political competition in municipalities with smaller 
populations and smaller fiscal budgets behaves differently to how it behaves in medium-sized 
and larger municipalities. Smaller municipalities could represent lower marginal votes for 
politicians running for Congress elections. However, if the municipality clusters within a 
region with high electoral mobilization, its marginal votes could be decisive in the electoral 
contest.  
 
Regarding fiscal variables the expected relationships are quite simple. Higher per capita 
municipal budget is expected to be positively related to public goods provision. The effect 
from the share of transfers and the share of urban property tax revenue could be positive or 
negative depending on the context. For example, if transfers are allocated with compensatory 
criteria, then larger shares are associated with lower provision of public goods. Nonetheless 
if transfers are heavily invested in the expansion of certain public goods, their expected effect 
is positive. Likewise a larger share of urban property tax could signal better local governance 
(positive effect) or an overly concentrated or small local tax base (negative effect). 
 
5.1 Econometric Results 
 
Panel specifications are robust to alternative measures used in both dependent and 
independent variables (levels and logs), and also show stability in the signs of the 
coefficients. In contrast, results from cross-section specifications, equation (1), are less stable 
and hard to interpret as signs of political competition measures were contrary to what was 
expected. This lack of robustness could be attributed to the fact that we are using the already 
defined averages for at least two elections instead of measures of consecutive elections. For 
this reason a panel specification is more suitable for comparisons of averages of performance 
of municipal government and political competition.   
 
Tables A.3.1 to A.3.5 and Tables A.4.1 A.4.5 in the Appendix report, respectively, 
estimations of coefficients of 𝛽1 using equation (2), and using equation (3) and (4).  Each 
table gathers results using the same dependent variable either measured in log-odds ratio or 
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logs. For the independent variables, we take the log of seven political competition variables 
plus two other joint specifications. The first joint specification combines the simultaneous 
effect of the log of the effective number of parties and turnout, and the second adds the 
interaction between these two variables, that is C_a.  Thus each table contains results from 
nine estimations with basic controls and nine estimations with all controls for each country.  
Likewise Tables A.5.1 to A.5.5 and Tables A.6.1 to A.6.5 also in the Appendix summarize, 
respectively, estimations of coefficients of 𝛽2 using equation (2) and (3)
17. 
 
These specifications correspond to a log-log model which is useful to explore relationships 
in terms of growth rates and elasticities. We highlight these results among many other 
alternative regressions because it seems to have been more challenging for the coefficients 
to reach significance in this model. In this way we apply a strict reference point to start 
assessing the hypotheses.   
 
Tables A.7.1 to A.7.3 summarize information on the coefficients of political competition 
variables (𝛽1) that reach significance (1%, 5% or 10%) as well as their signs indicating the 
estimator used. For example the first cell in Table A.7.1, corresponding to water coverage in 
Brazil as the dependent variable, reports the following: (-)FE, RE-Basic, H&T. This means 
that the coefficient for the difference of two main party’s vote share (difrank2) always takes 
a negative sign and is significant using the fixed effect model (FE) with both sets of controls, 
the random effect models and basic controls (RE-Basic), and applying the Hausman & Taylor 
estimator (H&T). The first cell in Table A.7.2 has no content indicating that when sewer 
coverage in Colombia is the dependent variable, the variable difrank2 is never significant.  
 
The effect of political competition variables on the provision of sewer coverage is strong in 
Mexico and almost non-existent in Colombia. Table A.7.3 shows that for Mexico the 
difference of the two main parties’ vote share (difrank2) takes a negative sign while the 
effective number of parties (enp) and the indexes pc_a, C_a and C_c take positive signs 
thereby supporting hypothesis 1. Nevertheless turnout and index C_b show a negative but 
significant coefficient indicating that higher turnout and electoral stability relate negatively 
to sewer coverage. In the last two regressions, the coefficients of turnout continue to be 
negative and the coefficients of enp switch signs. In the next section we will elaborate on this 
result. Table A.7.2 points out that some political indicators are significant and take the 
expected sign in Colombia when using the RE estimator and all controls.  
 
As to water coverage, the Mexican pattern of results is similar to that of sewerage coverage. 
In Colombia, measures of enp and C_a  take positive signs as expected under the FE 
estimators, while turnout and C_b reach significance only through the RE estimator, which 
suggests a weaker effect of political competition variables. In Brazil all measures show strong 
support for hypothesis 1, although none of the political variables are significant in the last 
joint regression.  
 
Results for the log of the gross rate of primary education show that Mexico sticks to the same 
pattern of results already found. In Colombia, only difrank2, enp and turnover are significant 
                                                 
17 Results using the Hausman & Taylor in Tables A.4.1 to A.4.5 correspond to regressions in which the fiscal 
variable was the municipal revenue per capita. No joint specifications were run for this estimator.  
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under the FE and H&T estimators (the last two measures reach significance using the RE 
estimator). Nonetheless turnover shows a negative sign contrary to the expected one again 
suggesting a less consistent and weaker effect. Results for Brazil indicate that all political 
measures are significant and take expected signs under the RE estimator with basic controls 
as well as the H&T estimator.  Coefficients using the FE estimator in Brazil are less stable 
as they switch signs according to the set of controls.   
 
Concerning infant mortality, Mexico follows exactly the same pattern as before, while 
Colombia provides support for hypothesis 1 in all individual measures of political 
competition, except C_b, when the FE and the H&T estimators are applied; some significant 
coefficients, although with opposite signs, are also reached by the RE estimator. Brazil 
displays significant coefficients with right signs for almost all political variables by using the 
FE estimator with basic controls, the RE and the H&T estimators. The exception in this case 
is turnout which positively affects the rate of infant mortality. 
 
Finally regarding the student-teacher ratio in primary education, results in Mexico using the 
FE and H&T estimators show strong statistical significance and the expected signs in 
difrank2, enp, pc_a, and C_c.  The effect regarding turnover and C_b once more takes a sign 
contrary to the expected suggesting that higher turnout and electoral stability increases this 
ratio. The last two joint regressions confirm these effects. Also, results using the RE estimator 
take wrong signs in cases such as C_a, C_b and C_c.  In Colombia, none of the political 
variables exert a statistically significant influence over this ratio. Brazil offers a more 
supportive picture for hypothesis 1as the signs of political competition variables stay stable 
under the two sets of controls and the FE, RE and H&T estimators (stronger significance 
with basic controls). Yet index C_b shows a positive and significant coefficient, suggesting 
that higher electoral stability increases the student-teacher ratio in primary education instead 
of reducing it (as well as pc_a using RE and all controls).  
 
In sum, Brazil and Mexico are the cases that more consistently provide support for hypothesis 
1. The former country shows a strong connection of political competition variables with 
water coverage, infant mortality rate, and the student-teacher ratio in primary education.  The 
latter country extends such a connection to sewer coverage and years of education in the 
population that is older than 15 years (edu15), although the behavior of turnout and index 
C_b remains puzzling. The fact that turnout and electoral stability are inversely associated 
with the provision of these public goods puts forward the idea that voter participation and 
stable electoral loyalties are achieved by other means different to the delivery of public 
goods.  
 
In contrast, Colombia offers some statistical evidence towards supporting hypothesis 1 based 
on infant mortality, but partial and weak support using water coverage or the gross rate of 
primary education as dependent variables.  
 
The effect of fiscal variables is consistent with this balance as can be seen in Tables A.6.1 to 
A.6.5 and Tables A.7.1 to A.7.5. In Mexico and Brazil, per capita municipal revenues 
increase the provision of all public goods while the share of transfers in current revenues and 
the share of urban property tax in total tax revenues tend to negatively affect these provisions. 
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These inverse relationships suggest that poorer municipalities, where the provision of public 
goods is lower, are more dependent on federal transfers and the urban property tax.  
 
The Colombian case shows that per capita municipal revenues negatively affect sewage and 
water coverage with a statistical significance of 10% and 1% respectively, contrary to the 
expected effect. The other two fiscal variables are only significant in explaining the dynamics 
of these two utilities using the RE estimator and taking a negative sign. In contrast, per capita 
revenues and the share of transfers show a significant and negative coefficient when 
explaining the ratio of infant mortality which is the only public good where political variables 
boast coherent explanatory power if the FE estimator is applied.  The primary education rate 
and the student-teacher ratio are significantly affected by fiscal variables only via the RE 
estimator.  
 
Comparing coefficients of political variables between countries across all estimators and 
using basic controls, we find that Brazilian elasticities are larger for most of the political 
variables, except difrank2 in which case Mexican elasticity tend to exhibit greater values. 
Similarly coefficients of per capita municipal revenue and the share of total transfers are 
likely to take greater values in Brazil. These results provide support for hypothesis 2 on 
enhanced local accountability via decentralization. 
 
In assessing hypothesis 4, we apply the fixed effects estimator and the cross-section 
specification dividing the sample according to five population ranges: 0-10,000, 10,001-
30,000, 30,001-50,000, 50,001-250,000, and >250,001. We define these ranges using 
population histograms in our three countries. Overall 75-85% of municipalities lie in the first 
two ranges whereas only 2-3% of municipalities have populations greater than 250,000 
inhabitants.   
 
Once again we highlight panel data estimations because the signs of the coefficients behave 
more coherently than the cross-section results. Tables A.9.1 to A.9.5 presents the coefficients 
of political competition variables from panel data estimations using each of our five public 
goods. In the case of Brazil, only water coverage displays the expected signs in the political 
competition variables in contrast to the gross rate of primary education and infant mortality. 
Regarding water coverage, the significance of turnout across all ranges suggests that higher 
levels of voters’ electoral mobilization have a positive effect on this provision; furthermore 
these coefficients increase throughout the population ranges suggesting that turnout affects 
the provision of public goods more clearly in municipalities with more inhabitants. Also, 
political competition variables reach significance in the population range of 10,001-30,000 
inhabitants using the student-teacher ratio as the dependent variable.   
 
Estimations for Colombia show that measures such as enp and turnover have a significant 
and positive impact on water coverage in localities with 30,001-50,000 inhabitants. 
Coherently with all sample results, political variables show significant coefficients in 
explaining infant mortality across several population tiers, especially in turnout, whose 
coefficients increase throughout population ranges. In this light, voter participation has 
greater influence in larger municipalities.   
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The coefficients of political variables in Mexico continue offering strong support for 
hypothesis 1 across all population ranges. Once again the signs of turnout and index C_b are 
contrary to what was expected. The coefficients for difrank2, enp and turnout tend to exhibit 
higher values in the population ranges 10,001-30,000 and 30,001-50,000, indicating that the 
effect of electoral variables on the provision of public goods is larger in medium than in small 
and large municipalities. The exception is the student-teacher ratio where the coefficients of 
political competition variables increase in the different population ranges. In sum this 
exploratory analysis provides initial ground to continue working out hypothesis 4.  
 
5.2 Assessing Results  
 
We find that both the entry & exit dimension and voter sensitivity to partisan agency have an 
influence over the provision of local public goods. Also, indexes correcting for electoral 
volatility, such as C_b and C_c, exhibit explanatory power. All these effects are clearly 
mediated by the political structure and the use of fiscal resources in each country. In this 
section, we briefly assess our results vis-à-vis those found by Arvate (2012), Cleary (2007),   
and Sánchez & Pachón (2013) keeping in mind differences in research design.   
 
According to our results, higher political competition in Brazilian lower chamber elections 
increases water coverage and reduces infant mortality and the student-teacher ratio. Arvate 
(2012), using mayoral elections for 2001-2004, finds a positive effect of the number of 
effective parties on the number of students and teachers in primary schools and free 
immunizations. In this author’s view, Brazilian municipalities enjoy certain features that 
create a favorable environment for local political competition: total autonomy to decide on 
the supply of public goods, free entry of candidates and compulsory voting.  
 
It could be that local governments in Brazil perform as the Chicago School predicts, however, 
to provide a systemic picture of political competition, other levels of political agency must 
be examined simply because of nested structures within government and concurrent fiscal 
spending.  Arvate’s results must be contextualized in a political scenario characterized by 
fragmented politics, high political transaction costs and accountability issues (Osterkatz, 
2012).  It is necessary to carefully examine the evidence that relates fiscal and political 
decentralization with stronger political responsiveness of federal deputies, and consider the 
effect introduced by the Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores) in the national politics 
since the 1990s.  
 
In Mexican politics, Cleary (2012) finds that the margin of victory in mayoral elections does 
not influence the provision of sewage and water coverage. Instead he finds a positive effect 
of turnout, literacy rates and poverty over this supply (1990-2000).  Contrariwise, we find 
that all entry & exit measures of political competition in lower chamber elections positively 
influence the provision of public goods, while turnout and the index of electoral stability C_b 
do it negatively. We hypothesize that the strong nationalization of the party system in Mexico 
channeled the influence of federal deputies into local governments and we provide initial 
affirmative econometric evidence for hypothesis 3.  The fact that turnout and C_b  take signs 
contrary to those postulated in hypothesis 1 suggests that the effect of coordination between 
local and national politicians over voters’ participation and electoral stability are against 
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political responsiveness.  Under this light, these dimensions of political competition are in 
deficit in the Mexican system.  
 
Although this is an exploratory analysis, these results underscore underlying tensions 
between fiscal and political decentralization expressed in local government performance. 
Despite the fact that Mexico is the least decentralized country of our three, the nationalization 
of the party system and governmental hierarchies have served the provision of key local 
public goods such as sewage and water coverage comparatively well. Seen by the 
nationalization of the party system indicator, local governments were responsive to their 
constituencies’ needs not only by means of the higher number of effective parties or a lower 
margin of electoral victory, but also due to party incentives and governmental hierarchies. 
More research in this direction would help us to approach more appropriately the incentive 
structure for local governments.18  
 
As to Colombia electoral contestability and vulnerability has increased since 1991, but voter 
participation has continued at low levels. The party system is highly fragmented and volatile, 
while some local communities face threats of violence that put political contesters at risk and 
disincentivize voters. As a result, political competition indexes have not strongly improved, 
and in the cases of threatened localities, measures of political competition turn out to be 
meaningless. Electoral reforms to enhance the entry & exit dimension brought a political 
opening that was insufficient to reactivate communities politically. The results that show a 
disconnection between electoral politics and government performance is therefore no big 
surprise.   
 
Sánchez & Pachón (2013) find that indicators of political competition based on mayoral 
elections has no effect on education and water coverage, but suggest that national politics do 
influence those provisions insofar as stronger competition in the lower chamber introduce 
the right incentives for mayors to update the cadastral records, which in turn means increasing 
tax revenues for municipalities. According to these authors, the local fiscal effort, instead of 
national transfers or royalties, fosters the provision of education and water coverage in 
Colombian municipalities.  In the same line, we did not find significant relationships between 
our set of public goods and our three fiscal variables (per capita municipal revenues, share 
of urban property tax, and share of transfers). 
 
Nonetheless infant mortality was the only dependent variable, consistently and significantly 
affected by political competition in Colombian lower chamber elections. We explain this 
effect as the outcome of several governmental actions undertaken and supported at the 
national level such as the AIEPI strategy (Atencion Integral Enfermedades Prevalentes de la 
Infancia) and the extension of the social security coverage in the last two decades. Let us 
recall that infant mortality is a proxy of health services for small children and basic sanitation; 
it is affected by several actions at the local level, such as infant immunization, health and 
nutrition services for women and small children, sewage and water coverage, and sanitation 
campaigns.  As of 2000, Díaz (2003) finds that infant mortality in Colombia decreased as a 
                                                 
18 Doing this would provide sound ground to discuss views such as that of Sánchez & Pachón (2013), whereby 
they stated that local politicians who are totally independent from national politicians become responsive to 
their communities’ needs.  
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result of improvement in health services for small children, among other factors. However, 
this decline has not been homogeneous between socio-economic levels. Inequality in this 
overall decline of infant mortality is coherent with the fact that other determining variables 
of basic sanitation (i.e. sewerage and water coverage) expand sluggishly and unevenly across 
municipalities.  
 
Our exploratory results for Colombia also highlight the weak relationship between local 
public goods provision and public spending, which goes in the same direction of previous 
studies questioning the efficiency of this spending. Decentralization efforts, from the 
panorama of all municipalities and not just a few cities, look shaky. That is why the political 
foundations of decentralization processes and effective implementation need to be better 
understood before they can bear fruit.  
 
 
6. Conclusions  
 
Based on panel data including several economic and political indicators from 1990 to 2010, 
this exploratory analysis finds that the entry & exit dimension and voter sensitivity to partisan 
agency, as well as indexes correcting for electoral volatility in lower chamber elections do 
influence the provision of key local public goods. This occurs in a strong way in Brazil and 
Mexico but much less decisively in Colombia.   
 
A multidimensional view of political competition has widened our understanding of this 
phenomenon in these three young democracies insofar as several measures were taken into 
account and Congress elections were considered. Thus the entry of new parties and their 
relative electoral strength are as important as voter turnout and electoral stability because all 
these variables inform us about the linkage between political parties and voters which, if 
aligned, could bring about government responsiveness. Using lower chamber elections 
highlights the role of governmental structure and the party system which mediate and set up 
the incentive framework for local governments. From this perspective, favorable results in 
Brazil are closely related to its relatively advanced local and political decentralization, while 
in Mexico, hierarchical government and strongly nationalized party system channels positive 
effects on political responsiveness through indicators of the entry & exit dimension but 
negative ones through variables related to voter sensitivity to partisan agency and electoral 
stability.  In Colombia, political competition has intensified in the entry & exit dimension 
but has continued withering in terms of voter participation and electoral stability; 
furthermore, fiscal decentralization does not show strong connection with the local provision 
of public goods.  
 
Our analysis underscores the role of national politics in the performance of local governance 
and the underlying tensions between fiscal and political decentralization, thereby suggesting 
that the effects of fiscal decentralization could decisively hinge on features of the party 
system.  
 
These insights are exploratory and must be taken cautiously; nonetheless the fact that they 
are in line with related studies boosts our confidence in the direction of results. Future work 
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will tackle econometric issues such as simultaneity and spatial effects. The goal is to account 
for the heterogeneity of within-country development, single out the dynamics of cities as well 
as identify the role of economically central areas versus peripheral ones. Likewise, we would 
deepen our characterization of both political competition patterns and anti-political 
competition patterns (i.e. collusion), which co-exist in these political systems as the 
multidimensional approach points out. Ultimately this analysis aims to shed light upon the 
political foundations of local development in the context of Brazil, Colombia and Mexico. 
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Appendix 
  
 Table A.1.1 Brazil: Database Sources 
Variable Unit Source 
Sanitation &Health  
Water 
Coverage  
%  1991,2000, 2010 
Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA)  
(Domicílios - com água encanada) 
Sewerage 
coverage 
%  1991,2000
1
 
Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA) 
(Domicílios -  com instalações sanitárias rede geral – número2) 
Infant 
mortality  
% 1991,2000, 2010 
Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA) 
Mortalidade infantil (por mil nascidos vivos) 
Education 
Enrollme
nt 
Primary 
school 
(gross 
rate) 
% 1991, 2000, 2010 
Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA) 
(Taxa de frequência bruta ao fundamental) 
Student-
teacher 
ratio in 
primary  
ratio 2003-2009, 2012 
Authors’ calculation. RAD = (MPrim/DPrim)  
Students 
and 
teachers 
in 
primary 
school 
persons 2003-2009, 2012 
Ministério da Educação, Instituto Nacional de Estudos e Pesquisas 
Educacionais - INEP -, Censos Educacionais.  
ESTATCAR - IGBE 
Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica (IBGE) 
(Matriculas ensino fundamental -MPrim; Docentes ensino fundamental-
DPrim) 
Public Finances 
Municipal 
budget 
(Revenues, 
expenditur
es)  
Reais 2000-2012 FINBRA 
https://www.tesouro.fazenda.gov.br/pt/finbra-financas-municipais 
(Receitas, Despesas) 
 
 
                                                          
1
 Data for this variable in 2010 is not reliable. 
2
 Calculation using formula: [Number of houses with swerage (ALn)/Total number of houses (Dn)] x 100 
GDP & Development 
GDP 
(municipa
l) 
 
Reais of 
2000  
1996, 1999-2010 
http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/estatistica/pesquisas/pesquisa_resulta
dos.php?id_pesquisa=46 
(PIB  municipal Reais a preços do ano 2000) Deflator Implícito do 
PIB nacional 
Conversio
n factors  
 PIB per capita - R$ (mil)  - Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada 
(IPEA) - GAC_PIBCAPN  
GDP per capita (constant LCU Base 2000) 
PPP conversion factor, GDP (LCU per international $) 
http://data.worldbank.org 
Index of 
Human 
Develop
ment  
 1991, 2000, 2010 
http://www.ipeadata.gov.br/ 
Índice de Desenvolvimento Humano -IDH 
Gini 
Index 
 1991, 2000, 2010  
Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA) 
Homicid
e rate 
rate 2005-2009 
Datasus - Site SUS (Sistema Único de Saúde) 
(Per 100.000 inhabitans) 
 
Area  Km2 1991,1998, 2000, 2010 
Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IPEA) 
(Área Geográfica publicada nos Censos) 
Populatio
n 
persons 1996, 2000, 2007, 2010 
Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística 
Electoral variables 
Political 
competiti
on 
measures 
Rates 1994-2010 
Repositorio de datos electorales 
http://www.tse.jus.br/eleicoes/repositorio-de-dados-eleitorais 
Authors’ calculations based on elections of federal deputies 
Electoral 
potential  
persons 1994-2010 
http://www.ipeadata.gov.br/ 
Eleitorado 
 
 
  
Table A.1.2 Colombia: Database Sources 
Variable Unit Source 
Sanitation &Health  
Water 
Coverage  
%  2005, 2008, 2011 
Cobertura Total de Acueducto 
(Número de viviendas que cuentan con el servicio / Total de viviendas en el 
municipio) x 100. 
Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE), 
Superintendencia de Servicios Públicos Domiciliarios (SSPD) 
Instituto Geográfico Agustín Codazzi (IGAC) - Sistema de Información 
Geográfica para la Planeación y el Ordenamiento Territorial (SIGOT).  
2013. http://sigotn.igac.gov.co/sigotn/default.aspx 
Sewerage 
coverage 
%  2005, 2008, 2011 
Cobertura Total de Alcantarillado 
(Número de viviendas que cuentan con el servicio / Total de viviendas en el 
municipio) x 100.  http://sigotn.igac.gov.co/sigotn/default.aspx 
Infant 
mortality  
% 2005-2009 
Tasa de Mortalidad infantil.  
 [(Número de defunciones de niños menores de un año / Número de nacidos 
vivos al año) x 1000]. Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística 
(DANE) 
Federación Colombiana de Municipios (FCM). Noviembre de 2013 
http://www.fcm.org.co/index.php?id=162 
Education 
Enrollme
nt 
Primary 
school 
(gross 
rate) 
% 1998-2011 
Cobertura bruta en educación primaria. 
(Número de estudiantes Primaria / población en el rango de edad Primaria) 
X 100. Ministerio de Educación Nacional (MEN) 2013. 
http://sigotn.igac.gov.co/sigotn/default.aspx 
Student-
teacher 
ratio in 
primary  
ratio 2003-2008 
 [(Número de alumnos en ciclo básico y medio  / Número de profesores en 
ciclo básico y medio) x 100]. http://sigotn.igac.gov.co/sigotn/default.aspx 
Public Finances 
Municipal 
budget 
(Revenues, 
expenditur
es)  
Thous
ands 
of 
pesos 
1998-2012 
Ejecuciones Presupuestales Municipales (Miles de pesos corrientes) 
Departamento Nacional de Planeación (DNP). Noviembre de 2013 
https://www.dnp.gov.co/Programas/DesarrolloTerritorial/FinanzasP%C3%
BAblicasTerritoriales/EjecucionesPresupuestales.aspx 
https://www.dnp.gov.co/Programas/DesarrolloTerritorial/FinanzasP%C3%
BAblicasTerritoriales/Hist%C3%B3ricodeParticipacionesTerritoriales.aspx 
Conversion  PPP conversion factor, GDP (LCU per international $) 
factor  http://data.worldbank.org 
GDP & Development 
Non 
residential 
Consumpti
on of Kw 
Kw  2003-2007 
Consumo promedio de Energía por habitante en sector No Residencial  
Superintendencia de Servicios Públicos Domiciliarios (SSPD) 2013. 
http://sigotn.igac.gov.co/sigotn/default.aspx 
Index of 
municipal 
Developme
nt  
 2002-2010 
Indice de Desarrollo municipal.  
Departamento Nacional de Planeación (DNP). Noviembre de 2013 
https://www.dnp.gov.co/Programas/DesarrolloTerritorial/Evaluaci%C3%
B3nySeguimientodelaDescentralizaci%C3%B3n/DocumentosdeEvaluaci
%C3%B3n.aspx 
Index of 
municipal 
poverty 
% 2005 
Indice de Pobreza Multidimensional (IPM) 
Departamento de Planeación Nacional (DNP). Noviembre de 2013 
https://www.dnp.gov.co/Programas/DesarrolloSocial/Pol%C3%ADticasSo
cialesTransversales/Promoci%C3%B3ndelaequidadyreducci%C3%B3ndel
apobreza.aspx 
Homicide 
rate 
rate 1998-2011 
[Número de homicidios comunes al año por municipio / (población total 
municipio / 100.000)]. Vicepresidencia de la República 2013. 
http://sigotn.igac.gov.co/sigotn/default.aspx 
Area  Km2 Área oficial en Kilómetros cuadrados (Km2). 
http://sigotn.igac.gov.co/sigotn/default.aspx 
Population persons 1993-2012 
Número total de personas  que residen el municipio  
(Urbano/Rural). Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística 
(DANE). 2013. http://sigotn.igac.gov.co/sigotn/default.aspx 
Electoral variables 
Political 
competitio
n measures 
rates 1994-2010 
Bases de datos sobre resultados electorales CEDE, Universidad de los 
Andes https://datoscede.uniandes.edu.co/ 
Observatorio de procesos electorales, Universidad del Rosario 
http://www.urosario.edu.co/ope/ 
Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil, Colombia 
http://www.registraduria.gov.co/-Historico-de-Resultados-.html 
Authors’ calculations based on elections of deputies in lower chamber 
Turnout  rate Authors’ calculations based on elections of deputies in lower chamber 
  
 Table A.1.3 Mexico: Database Sources 
Variable Unit Source 
Sanitation &Health  
Water 
Coverage  
%  1995, 2000,2005,2010  
http://sc.inegi.org.mx/sistemas/cobdem/ 
Indice de agua entubada 
Sewerage 
coverage 
%  1995, 2000,2005,2010  
http://sc.inegi.org.mx/sistemas/cobdem/ 
Indice de drenaje 
Infant 
mortality  
% 2000, 2005, 2010 
http://www.inafed.gob.mx/es/inafed/Socioeconomico_Municipal 
Tasa de mortalidad infantil: Defunciones menores de 1 año X 1000 
nacimientos en el año. 
Education 
Yers of 
education 
in 
populatio
n older 
than 15 
% 1995, 2000,2005,2010 
 http://sc.inegi.org.mx/sistemas/cobdem/ 
Grado promedio de escolaridad de la población de 15 y más años 
Student-
teacher 
ratio in 
primary  
ratio 2000-2010 
http://www.inafed.gob.mx/es/inafed/Socioeconomico_Municipal 
Students 
and 
teachers 
in 
primary 
school 
persons 1994-2004 
http://sc.inegi.org.mx/sistemas/cobdem/ 
2005-2010 
http://www.inafed.gob.mx/es/inafed/Socioeconomico_Municipal 
Personal docente en primaria, alumnos en primaria (modalidad 
escolarizada) 
Public Finances 
Municipal 
budget 
(Revenues, 
expenditur
es)  
Pesos 1996-2010 
http://www.inafed.gob.mx/es/inafed/Municipales 
Ingresos y egresos brutos municipales  
GDP & Development 
GDP 
(municipa
Constant 
2010 US$  
2000, 2005, 2010 
http://www.inafed.gob.mx/es/inafed/Socioeconomico_Municipal 
l) per 
capita 
Producto interno bruto per cápita (dólares PPC, precios 2010) 
Conversio
n factors 
 GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2011 international $) 
GDP per capita, PPP (current international $) 
PPP conversion factor, GDP (LCU per international $) 
http://data.worldbank.org  
Index of 
Human 
Develop
ment  
 1995, 2000, 2005  
http://sc.inegi.org.mx/sistemas/cobdem/ 
2000, 2005, 2010  
http://www.inafed.gob.mx/es/inafed/Socioeconomico_Municipal 
Poverty % 2010 
http://www.inafed.gob.mx/es/inafed/Socioeconomico_Municipal 
Pobreza (% de personas) 
Homicid
e rate 
rate 1994-2011 
http://sc.inegi.org.mx/sistemas/cobdem/ 
Número de homicidios comunes al año por municipio / (población total 
municipio / 100.000) 
Area  Km2 2005 http://sc.inegi.org.mx/sistemas/cobdem/ 
Populatio
n 
persons 1995, 2000,2005,2010 
 http://sc.inegi.org.mx/sistemas/cobdem/ 
Electoral variables 
Political 
competiti
on 
measures 
rates 1994-2012 
Atlas de resultados electorales federales 1991-2012 
http://siceef.ife.org.mx/pef2012/SICEEF2012.html# 
Authors’ calculations based on elections of federal deputies in lower 
chamber (plurality voting) 
Turnout  rate 1994-2006, 2012: Presidential elections   
2009: Lower chamber elections  
http://siceef.ife.org.mx/pef2012/SICEEF2012.html# 
 
Variable Var Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Sewage system coverage (%) AL 5507 18.18 25.71 0.00 96.39 0
Water coverage (%) AC 5564 60.04 29.79 0.00 100.00 5564 85.60 14.72 0.15 100.00
Primary education (gross rate) CPrim 5564 98.81 10.18 29.92 149.05 5564 111.86 9.74 64.71 195.59
Ratio Student-teacher in primary school (a) RAD 5564 19.34 4.81 7.08 47.43 5564 18.12 4.27 6.70 65.68
Infant mortality (%) MI 5564 40.28 18.66 13.00 106.06 5564 19.25 7.14 8.49 46.80
Municipal revenue,  percapita (intert. dollars) A_P 5304 711.60 1431.26 73.61 82254.16 5561 1036.01 650.65 307.08 20649.10
Total transfers/ current revenue A13_A1 5304 0.90 0.11 0.19 1.00 5561 0.89 0.09 0.27 0.99
Urban property tax revenue/ tax revenue A1112_A11 5262 0.22 0.19 0.00 1.00 5561 0.15 0.13 0.00 0.90
Gross domestic product percapita (inter. dollars) PIB_P 5507 1930.64 2216.31 305.91 59019.68 5564 2779.33 3116.53 536.86 73052.08
Population (thousands) P 5507 30,833 186,751 795 10,400,000 5564 31,705 191,089 799 10,700,000
Population growth (%) CP 4974 0.03 0.14 -0.78 1.25 5564 0.01 0.02 -0.06 0.18
Demographic density (hab/Km2) DDemo 5507 97.97 533.63 0.13 12915.98 5564 108.19 572.45 0.13 13030.48
Index of human development IDH 5564 0.52 0.10 0.21 0.82 5564 0.66 0.07 0.42 0.86
Gini Index IG 5564 0.54 0.06 0.34 0.83 5564 0.49 0.07 0.28 0.80
Turnout (%) turnout 5483 0.74 0.09 0.04 1.00 5569 0.74 0.06 0.47 1.00
Effective number of parties enp 5483 3.14 1.15 1.03 9.44 5569 4.07 1.34 1.21 12.57
Sum of the two main parties' vote share sumrank2 5483 0.74 0.13 0.33 1.00 5569 0.65 0.12 0.27 0.96
Difference of the two main parties' vote share difrank2 5481 0.28 0.21 0.00 0.98 5569 0.20 0.13 0.00 0.86
Vote share of the smallest party pvotes_s 5483 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.50 5569 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
Electoral volatility EV 5483 0.34 0.18 0.00 0.50 5569 0.42 0.13 0.09 0.88
First principal component pc_a 5481 -0.65 1.39 -4.33 4.06 5569 0.285 1.239 -3.820 5.611
enp*turnout C_a 5483 2.34 0.92 0.05 6.65 5569 3.030 1.073 0.868 9.672
enp*turnout/EV C_b 5164 5.93 4.82 0.01 81.04 5569 9.176 4.773 1.607 39.688
enp*turnout/(│EV-EVstate│-1) C_c 5164 2.13 0.95 0.00 6.81 5569 2.732 1.037 0.615 8.201
Source: Table A.1.1. (a) Averages: 2003-2006 and 2007-2012
->
Table A.2.1 Brazil: Descriptive statistics
1991-2000 2001-2010
Variable Var Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Sewage system coverage (%) AL 1113 41.09 26.63 0.00 98.20 1113 40.85 25.97 0.00 99.15
Water coverage (%) AC 1113 65.13 22.98 0.00 98.65 1113 63.39 22.92 0.00 99.45
Primary education (gross rate) CPrim 1118 121.45 25.69 15.70 339.23 1121 123.47 29.54 0.00 356.23
Ratio Student-teacher in primary school (a) RAD 47 31.21 2.31 26.48 36.00 48 30.89 3.63 23.60 43.45
Infant mortality (%) MI 1098 36.40 14.58 9.46 116.69 1103 34.53 13.95 8.66 101.52
Municipal revenue,  percapita (inter. dollars) A_P 1097 176.76 193.30 0.00 2103.63 1101 498.99 386.43 0.00 6126.15
Total transfers per capita (inter. dollars) A13_P 807 0.79 0.16 0.17 0.99 1096 0.82 0.14 0.16 0.99
Urban property tax revenue/ tax revenue A1112_A11 807 0.49 0.22 0.00 1.00 1096 0.40 0.21 0.00 1.00
Nonresidential consumption of energy (kw Percapita)ENnr 1046 2,743,396 39,700,000 0 1,270,000,000 1054 3,954,144 31,800,000 0 895,000,000
Population (thousands) P 1101 38,146 229,854 0 6,680,805 1101 39,557 240,209 0 6,997,722
Population growth CP 1097 0.00 0.02 -0.07 0.07 1097 0.00 0.02 -0.26 0.05
Demographic density (hab/Km2) DDemo 1039 141.69 619.30 0.16 13484.09 1039 146.74 650.40 0.16 14148.44
Index of municipal development INDEMUN 1097 34.57 9.53 10.46 74.01 1097 56.73 10.09 4.93 86.02
Index of municipal poverty (2005) IPM 1113 0.69 0.16 0.14 1.00
Turnout (%) turnout 1119 0.40 0.12 0.00 1.00 1122 0.45 0.10 0.13 0.76
Effective number of parties enp 1118 2.64 0.89 1.00 7.66 1122 3.35 0.99 1.22 7.49
Sum of the two main parties' vote share sumrank2 1118 0.81 0.11 0.44 1.00 1122 0.71 0.11 0.40 0.99
Difference of the two main parties' vote share difrank2 1118 0.37 0.21 0.02 1.00 1122 0.24 0.17 0.00 0.87
Vote share of the smallest party pvotes_s 1118 0.01 0.05 0.00 1.00 1122 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.18
Electoral volatility EV 1119 0.27 0.13 0.00 0.70 1122 0.44 0.14 0.09 0.98
First principal component pc_a 1118 -0.42 1.21 -3.33 3.95 1122 0.58 1.21 -2.89 4.18
enp*turnout C_a 1118 1.07 0.48 0.16 3.65 1122 1.51 0.53 0.29 3.44
enp*turnout/EV C_b 1113 4.74 4.93 0.18 81.23 1122 4.06 1.82 0.41 17.09
enp*turnout/(│EV-EVstate│-1) C_c 1113 1.12 0.54 0.08 3.84 1122 1.39 0.51 0.25 3.16
Source: Table A.1.2. (a) Averages: 2003-2006 and 2007-2008
Table A.2.2 Colombia: Descriptive statistics
1998-2005 2006-2011
Variable Var Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Sewage system coverage (%) AL 2447 53.78 0.28 0.00 0.99 2447 74.54 0.25 0.00 1.00
Water coverage (%) AC 2447 79.03 0.20 0.00 1.00 2447 85.02 0.18 0.00 1.00
Yers of education in population older than 15 edu15 2447 5.73 1.55 0.00 12.50 2447 6.66 1.52 2.00 13.50
Ratio Student-teacher in primary school (a) RAD 2447 20.44 3.78 0.00 32.87 2447 19.14 4.03 7.98 103.57
Infant mortality (%) MI 2446 26.72 7.28 10.33 69.39 2447 17.01 6.71 8.06 56.70
Municipal revenue,  percapita (inter. dollars) A_P 2435 164.51 144.28 0.00 1467.12 2446 271.57 208.00 0.00 2326.27
Total transfers/current revenue A5_A1 2423 0.88 0.10 0.33 1.00 2422 0.90 0.11 0.25 1.00
Urban property tax revenue/tax revenue A1112_A11 2381 0.78 1.22 0.00 53.78 2252 0.76 0.38 0.01 14.86
Gross domestic product percapita (inter. dollars) PIB_P 2410 4949.35 3003.66 919.22 32603.00 2446 6568.48 3325.38 1608.18 37077.81
Population (thousands) P 2449 38,503 115,312 0 1,734,976 2447 42,169 126,748 0 1,820,888
Population growth CP 2413 0.05 0.11 -0.51 1.22 2434 0.00 0.13 -0.60 1.19
Demographic density (hab/Km2) DDemo 2446 242.17 1143.69 0.00 19295.89 2446 261.80 1158.93 0.12 17893.44
Index of human development IDH 2435 0.71 0.07 0.40 0.90 2446 0.77 0.07 0.44 0.97
Index of poverty Pbr 2447 67.34 18.49 8.75 97.35
Turnout (%) turnout 2449 0.58 0.10 0.21 1.00 2447 0.52 0.11 0.14 1.00
Effective number of parties enp 2436 2.42 0.47 1.09 4.05 2443 2.87 0.54 1.19 5.51
Sum of the two main parties' vote share sumrank2 2436 0.85 0.07 0.62 1.00 2443 0.78 0.09 0.47 0.99
Difference of the two main parties' vote share difrank2 2436 0.27 0.16 0.02 0.95 2442 0.17 0.12 0.00 0.86
Vote share of the smallest party pvotes_s 2436 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.59 2443 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.12
Electoral volatility EV 2436 0.21 0.07 0.03 0.64 2443 0.41 0.06 0.21 0.56
First principal component pc_a 2436 -0.58 1.02 -3.98 2.29 2442 0.35 1.02 -3.64 4.44
enp*turnout C_a 2436 1.37 0.43 0.35 13.60 2443 1.46 0.38 0.40 3.32
enp*turnout/EV C_b 2433 6.80 3.53 1.20 46.51 2443 3.75 1.23 0.83 8.20
enp*turnout/(│EV-EVstate│-1) C_c 2436 1.23 0.42 0.27 11.30 2443 1.40 0.36 0.39 3.22
Source: Table A.1.3. (a) Averages: 1994-2006 and 2007-2010
1995-2005 2006-2010
Table A.2.3 Mexico: Descriptive statistics
Figure 1: Brazil, Competition Index a
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Figure 2: Brazil, Competition Index b
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Figure 3: Colombia, Competition Index a
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Figure 4: Colombia, Competition Index b
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Figure 5: Mexico, Competition Index a
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Figure 6: Mexico, Competition Index b
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Log C Basic All Basic All Log C Basic All Basic All Basic All 
difrank2       -.0192 -.0232 -.232*** -.152*** difrank2       -.0713*** -.0343** -.0312 -.0368 -.194*** -.148***
               0.0212 0.0211 0.0261 0.0239                0.0167 0.0152 0.0252 0.0252 0.0215 0.0212
enp            .059 .0705 1.89*** 1.24*** enp            .584*** .13** .136** .155** 1.07*** .712***
               0.056 0.0559 0.117 0.122                0.0569 0.054 0.0658 0.0665 0.0975 0.101
turnout        .126 .144 -7.02*** -5.21*** turnout        .89*** 1.35*** .0191 .0574 -3.76*** -2.57***
               0.109 0.112 0.218 0.294                0.207 0.173 0.111 0.113 0.267 0.317
pc_a           .0431* .0547** .171*** .0626*** pc_a           .0648*** .0333 .0561* .0737** .114*** .0474**
               0.0239 0.0239 0.0291 0.0224                0.0214 0.0204 0.0293 0.0307 0.0267 0.0231
C_a            .0788 .0909* .186* .229** C_a            .639*** .246*** .111* .134** .206** .237**
               0.0509 0.0508 0.111 0.105                0.0582 0.0532 0.0569 0.058 0.0962 0.0937
C_b            .0131 .0159 -.656*** -.412*** C_b            .308*** .0766** .0378 .0455 -.316*** -.173***
               0.0486 0.0489 0.0375 0.0386                0.0378 0.0314 0.0372 0.0374 0.0366 0.0366
C_c            .0613 .0734 .718*** .478*** C_c            .461*** .218*** .0926* .115** .364*** .223**
               0.0496 0.0495 0.111 0.108                0.0614 0.0499 0.0556 0.0566 0.0916 0.0924
enp            .0549 .0666 .795*** .7*** enp            .605*** .171*** .136** .154** .489*** .451***
               0.0554 0.0555 0.122 0.122                0.0585 0.0544 0.0656 0.0663 0.109 0.109
turnout        .119 .137 -6.2*** -4.6*** turnout        1.01*** 1.4*** .0033 .0422 -3.25*** -2.17***
               0.109 0.112 0.247 0.306                0.256 0.175 0.111 0.115 0.3 0.339
enp            -.474 -.434 -2.61*** -2.32*** enp            .0059 -.651 -.347 -.28 -1.86*** -1.53***
               0.344 0.349 0.4 0.397                0.803 0.706 0.331 0.338 0.284 0.285
turnout        -.403 -.358 -12.8*** -11.2*** turnout        .459 .656 -.474 -.388 -7.81*** -6.46***
               0.349 0.356 0.79 0.851                0.772 0.695 0.36 0.366 0.566 0.627
C_a            .531 .502 3.2*** 2.86*** C_a            .601 .825 .485 .436 2.19*** 1.87***
               0.336 0.339 0.34 0.341                0.803 0.703 0.328 0.333 0.249 0.252
Obs (1) 1756 1756 4388 4361 Obs (1)          10367 10024 1756 1756 4368 4341
(1) Median of observations for all 9 regressions. Coefficients of fiscal and control 
variables are not reported. Basic controls: logarithm of: per capita gross domestic 
product or its proxy, population and demographic density. All controls: basic 
controls plus population growth, index of human development and five clusters. The 
table reports Huber-White standard errors underneath coefficients. Statistical 
significance is conventionally noted: ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1 
(1) Median of observations for all 9 regressions. Coefficients of fiscal and control variables are not reported. 
Basic controls: logarithm of: per capita gross domestic product or its proxy, population and demographic 
density. All controls: basic controls plus population growth, index of human development and five clusters. The 
table reports Huber-White standard errors underneath. Statistical significance is conventionally noted: 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1 
Table A.3.1 Table A.3.2
Coefficients of political competition variables. Dependent variable: Log-
odds ratio of Sewage coverage, panel estimation fixed effects 
Coefficients of political competition variables. Dependent variable: Log-odds ratio of water coverage, 
panel estimation fixed effects 
COLOMBIA MEXICO BRAZIL COLOMBIA MEXICO
Log C Basic All Basic All Basic All 
difrank2       -9.8e-04 .0036** -.0053* -.005* -.0355*** -.0281***
               0.0016 0.0014 0.0029 0.0029 0.0024 0.0022
enp            .0281*** -.018*** .0217* .0216* .247*** .187***
               0.0054 0.005 0.0125 0.0124 0.0107 0.0111
turnout        .0037 .0332** -.0578** -.0459* -.712*** -.536***
               0.0156 0.0163 0.0251 0.0256 0.0218 0.031
pc_a           7.2e-04 -.0033* -8.5e-04 -.0012 .0194*** .0098***
               0.0019 0.0017 0.0043 0.0044 0.0027 0.0021
C_a            .0274*** -.014*** .0079 .0103 .081*** .0836***
               0.0054 0.005 0.0115 0.0116 0.0107 0.0092
C_b            .0192*** -2.8e-04 -.0093 -.0082 -.0755*** -.0534***
               0.0033 0.0028 0.0084 0.0081 0.0035 0.0036
C_c            .0167*** -.0084** .0028 .005 .13*** .102***
               0.0043 0.0039 0.01 0.0101 0.0103 0.0097
enp            .0283*** -.0171*** .0226* .0224* .15*** .139***
               0.0054 0.005 0.0124 0.0123 0.0107 0.0103
turnout        .0095 .0279* -.0592** -.0474* -.551*** -.406***
               0.0165 0.0165 0.0251 0.0256 0.024 0.0298
enp            -.0416 -.0938** -.115 -.111 -.299*** -.29***
               0.0468 0.0407 0.0806 0.0799 0.0364 0.0368
turnout        -.0554 -.0416 -.2** -.184** -1.42*** -1.34***
               0.0423 0.0354 0.082 0.0824 0.076 0.0848
C_a            .0701 .0769* .139* .135* .421*** .405***
               0.0469 0.0407 0.0824 0.0812 0.0324 0.0332
Obs (1)          10377 10032 1774 1774 4392 4365
(1) Median of observations for all 9 regressions. 2 Log of years of education in population older thaObs (1)5 
years. Coefficients of fiscal and control variables are not reported. Basic controls: logarithm of: per capita 
gross domestic product or its proxy, population and demographic density. All density. All controls: basic 
controls plus population growth, index of human development and five clusters. The table reports Huber-White 
standard errors underneath coefficients. Statistical significance is conventionally noted: ***p<.01, **p<.05, 
*p<.1 
Table A.3.3
Coefficients of political competition variables. Dependent variable: Log of primary education gross 
rate, panel estimation fixed effects 
BRAZIL COLOMBIA MEXICO 2
Log C Basic All Basic All Basic All Log C Basic All Basic All Basic All 
difrank2       .0191*** -.0073 .0147*** .0148*** .165*** .147*** difrank2       .007*** .0015 .0123 .0039 .0163*** .0119***
               0.0074 0.0049 0.0054 0.0054 0.0124 0.0123                0.0016 0.0016 0.0093 0.0067 0.0028 0.0028
enp            -.346*** 3.4e-04 -.0465*** -.0464*** -1.02*** -.899*** enp            -.038*** -.0075 -.0024 .0173 -.126*** -.0911***
               0.0247 0.017 0.0173 0.0171 0.0562 0.0624                0.0054 0.0053 0.0332 0.033 0.0106 0.0112
turnout        .169** .0472 -.0962*** -.103*** 2.69*** 2.53*** turnout        -.104*** -.045** -.0051 .0569 .403*** .298***
               0.0708 0.0547 0.0144 0.0156 0.134 0.183                0.0232 0.0223 0.109 0.102 0.0262 0.0319
pc_a           -.0373*** -.0109* -.0102*** -.0109*** -.0706*** -.0447*** pc_a           -.0071*** -.004* .0017 .0012 -.01*** -.0029
               0.0088 0.0061 0.0029 0.0029 0.014 0.0138                0.0024 0.0023 0.0095 0.0111 0.0029 0.0028
C_a            -.316*** .0018 -.048*** -.0485*** -.427*** -.443*** C_a            -.0427*** -.0104** -.005 .0173 -.0135 -.018*
               0.027 0.0166 0.0137 0.0138 0.053 0.0528                0.0052 0.0052 0.032 0.0292 0.0101 0.0098
C_b            -.183*** -.0233** .0024 .0019 .289*** .239*** C_b            .0069** .0134*** -.002 .0083 .0477*** .0344***
               0.0178 0.0097 0.0132 0.0128 0.0194 0.022                0.0031 0.0029 0.0193 0.0182 0.004 0.0042
C_c            -.181*** .0266** -.0294** -.0297** -.558*** -.506*** C_c            -.0386*** -.0134*** -.003 .021 -.0401*** -.028***
               0.0246 0.0125 0.0125 0.0127 0.0532 0.0548                0.0048 0.0047 0.032 0.0303 0.0101 0.0101
enp            -.344*** .0017 -.0405** -.0398** -.669*** -.675*** enp            -.0375*** -.0077 -.0024 .0167 -.0679*** -.0631***
               0.0247 0.017 0.0173 0.0171 0.0595 0.0612                0.0054 0.0053 0.0334 0.0328 0.0116 0.0117
turnout        .0975 .0478 -.0835*** -.0896*** 1.98*** 1.91*** turnout        -.101*** -.0454** -.0048 .0546 .33*** .239***
               0.0706 0.0547 0.0137 0.0145 0.144 0.181                0.0232 0.0223 0.109 0.104 0.0293 0.0339
enp            .0293 .298** -.184*** -.18*** 1.42*** 1.68*** enp            .211** .108 .936 .961* .0215 .0029
               0.176 0.128 0.041 0.0404 0.208 0.238                0.0833 0.0771 0.573 0.568 0.0342 0.0342
turnout        .444*** .316*** -.223*** -.227*** 6.03*** 7.03*** turnout        .105 .0502 .795 .853* .504*** .383***
               0.157 0.114 0.0404 0.0417 0.43 0.545                0.0772 0.0707 0.483 0.462 0.0693 0.0763
C_a            -.375** -.297** .145*** .143*** -1.95*** -2.23*** C_a            -.249*** -.116 -.938 -.944* -.0838*** -.0624**
               0.175 0.128 0.0385 0.0391 0.184 0.213                0.0833 0.0772 0.567 0.556 0.0293 0.0295
Obs (1) 10374 10030 1792 1792 4392 4365 Obs (1)          10915 10915 94 94 4392 4365
Coefficients of political competition variables. Dependent variable: Log-odds ratio of infant mortality, 
panel estimation fixed effects 
Table A.3.4
MEXICO
(1) Median of observations for all 9 regressions. Coefficients of fiscal and control variables are not reported. 
Basic controls: logarithm of: per capita gross domestic product or its proxy, population and demographic 
density. All density. All controls: basic controls plus population growth, index of human development and five 
clusters. The table reports Huber-White standard errors underneath coefficients. Statistical significance is 
conventionally noted: ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1 
(1) Median of observations for all 9 regressions. Coefficients of fiscal and control variables are not reported. 
Basic controls: logarithm of: per capita gross domestic product or its proxy, population and demographic 
density. All controls: basic controls plus population growth, index of human development and five clusters. The 
table reports Huber-White standard errors underneath coefficients. Statistical significance is conventionally 
BRAZIL COLOMBIAMEXICOCOLOMBIABRAZIL
Table A3.5
Coefficients of political competition variables. Dependent variable: Log of student-teacher ratio in 
primary education, panel estimation fixed effects 
Log C Basic All H&T Basic All H&T Log C Basic All H&T Basic All H&T Basic All H&T
difrank2       0.00667 0.0404 -0.0163 -0.274*** -0.203*** -0.316*** difrank2       -0.0739*** 0.0127 -0.0956*** -0.0461 -0.0116 -0.0258 -0.144*** -0.0842*** -0.237***
               (0.0313) (0.0303) (0.0209) (0.0248) (0.0236) (0.0282)                (0.0131) (0.0101) (0.0126) (0.0291) (0.0289) (0.128) (0.0292) (0.0286) (0.0238)
enp            0.00366 -0.123 0.0634 1.145*** 0.622*** 2.299*** enp            0.807*** -0.0139 0.858*** 0.106 -0.0183 0.133 0.908*** 0.481*** 1.271***
               (0.0791) (0.0778) (0.0552) (0.109) (0.113) (0.124)                (0.0369) (0.0308) (0.0400) (0.0742) (0.0748) (0.340) (0.122) (0.124) (0.110)
turnout        -0.0207 -0.231** 0.0686 -2.803*** -1.907*** -7.792*** turnout        1.191*** 0.359*** 0.992*** 0.392*** 0.213** -0.00529 -0.998*** -0.168 -4.098***
               (0.113) (0.114) (0.0987) (0.303) (0.290) (0.266)                (0.160) (0.109) (0.129) (0.105) (0.107) (0.589) (0.337) (0.330) (0.250)
pc_a           0.00809 -0.0107 0.0456* 0.0352* -0.00783 0.214* pc_a           0.0797*** 0.0239** 0.0876*** 0.0178 0.000652 0.0547 0.0255 -0.00416 0.125***
               (0.0365) (0.0353) (0.0267) (0.0209) (0.0201) (0.121)                (0.0139) (0.0115) (0.0158) (0.0272) (0.0270) (0.298) (0.0284) (0.0282) (0.0221)
C_a            -0.0160 -0.184*** 0.0741 0.643*** 0.318*** 0.396*** C_a            0.850*** 0.0120 0.902*** 0.221*** 0.0792 0.106 0.793*** 0.553*** 0.315***
               (0.0682) (0.0689) (0.0473) (0.0897) (0.0886) (0.124)                (0.0369) (0.0305) (0.0388) (0.0625) (0.0648) (0.292) (0.101) (0.0995) (0.111)
C_b            -0.0452 -0.102** 0.0157 -0.330*** -0.297*** -0.807*** C_b            0.560*** 0.00990 0.443*** 0.126** 0.0747 0.0401 -0.146*** -0.109** -0.388***
               (0.0535) (0.0522) (0.0350) (0.0447) (0.0435) (0.0357)                (0.0258) (0.0213) (0.0216) (0.0508) (0.0504) (0.205) (0.0497) (0.0484) (0.0341)
C_c            -0.0226 -0.182*** 0.0585 0.755*** 0.422*** 1.029*** C_c            0.607*** 0.00240 0.639*** 0.200*** 0.0640 0.0896 0.771*** 0.526*** 0.522***
               (0.0644) (0.0654) (0.0452) (0.0814) (0.0824) (0.124)                (0.0356) (0.0272) (0.0306) (0.0592) (0.0615) (0.277) (0.0952) (0.0947) (0.112)
enp            0.00285 -0.143* 0.913*** 0.447*** enp            0.817*** -0.00499 0.122 -0.00115 0.894*** 0.515***
               (0.0795) (0.0786) (0.115) (0.119)                (0.0371) (0.0309) (0.0745) (0.0757) (0.128) (0.129)
turnout        -0.0205 -0.252** -1.963*** -1.547*** turnout        1.265*** 0.358*** 0.401*** 0.213** -0.125 0.305
               (0.113) (0.115) (0.324) (0.306)                (0.179) (0.110) (0.105) (0.108) (0.359) (0.347)
enp            0.845 0.346 -2.658*** -2.292*** enp            0.336 0.311 -0.293 -0.682 -2.093*** -1.744***
               (0.625) (0.599) (0.336) (0.330)                (0.568) (0.532) (0.562) (0.559) (0.371) (0.377)
turnout        0.829 0.241 -10.34*** -8.168*** turnout        0.811 0.653 -0.0169 -0.474 -7.122*** -5.150***
               (0.641) (0.615) (0.741) (0.732)                (0.537) (0.524) (0.568) (0.568) (0.835) (0.861)
C_a            -0.845 -0.489 3.377*** 2.638*** C_a            0.481 -0.316 0.416 0.682 2.813*** 2.167***
               (0.623) (0.594) (0.281) (0.277)                (0.568) (0.532) (0.559) (0.554) (0.322) (0.330)
Obs (1) 1756 1756 1764 4388 4361 4411 Obs (1)          10367 10024 1756 1756 1764 4368 4341 4392
Table A.4.1 Table A.4.2
Coefficients of political competition variables. Dependent variable: Log-odds ratio of Sewage coverage, panel 
estimation  (RE-PCSE) Coefficients of political competition variables. Dependent variable: Log-odds ratio of water coverage, panel estimation (RE-PCSE)
COLOMBIA MEXICO BRAZIL COLOMBIA MEXICO
(1) Median of observations  for all 9 regressions. Coefficients of fiscal and control variables are not reported. Basic 
controls: logarithm of: per capita gross domestic product or its proxy, population and demographic density. All controls: 
basic controls plus population growth, index of human development and five clusters. The table reports panel corrected 
standard errors underneath coefficients. Statistical significance is conventionally noted: ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1 
1) Median of observations  for all 9 regressions. Coefficients of fiscal and control variables are not reported. Basic controls: logarithm of: per capita gross 
domestic product or its proxy, population and demographic density. All controls: basic controls plus population growth, index of human development and five 
clusters. The table reports panel corrected standard errors underneath coefficients. Statistical significance is conventionally noted: ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1 
Log C Basic All H&T Basic All H&T Basic All H&T
difrank2       -0.00580*** 0.000442 -0.00355*** -0.00105 -0.00154 -0.00539** -0.163*** -0.0142*** -0.0434***
               (0.00109) (0.000899) (0.00123) (0.00387) (0.00384) (0.00255) (0.0117) (0.00227) (0.00250)
enp            0.0664*** 0.0112*** 0.0534*** 0.0192 0.0236* 0.0199** 0.0449*** 0.101*** 0.287***
               (0.00297) (0.00272) (0.00401) (0.0134) (0.0133) (0.00840) (0.00354) (0.00970) (0.0103)
turnout        0.0228** -0.0375*** 0.0311** -0.0902*** -0.0710*** -0.0559*** -0.0845** 0.120*** -0.817***
               (0.0108) (0.0103) (0.0126) (0.0175) (0.0187) (0.0168) (0.0369) (0.0291) (0.0230)
pc_a           0.00437*** 0.00144 0.00100 -0.00432 -0.000777 0.000303 0.0257*** 0.00229 0.0236***
               (0.00102) (0.000925) (0.00172) (0.00580) (0.00574) (0.00401) (0.00171) (0.00175) (0.00153)
C_a            0.0643*** 0.00807*** 0.0541*** -0.0164 -0.00603 0.00606 0.0770*** 0.110*** 0.0967***
               (0.00302) (0.00271) (0.00391) (0.0108) (0.0111) (0.00759) (0.00527) (0.00815) (0.0114)
C_b            0.0429*** 0.00675*** 0.0324*** -0.0110 -0.00584 -0.00593 -0.00286*** -0.00139 -0.0940***
               (0.00196) (0.00170) (0.00221) (0.00884) (0.00856) (0.00547) (0.000567) (0.00417) (0.00326)
C_c            0.0463*** 0.00545** 0.0359*** -0.0172* -0.00781 0.000796 0.0710*** 0.0944*** 0.161***
               (0.00279) (0.00226) (0.00314) (0.0102) (0.0105) (0.00725) (0.00567) (0.00779) (0.0111)
enp            0.0666*** 0.0104*** 0.0157 0.0200 0.0479*** 0.127***
               (0.00297) (0.00273) (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.00365) (0.0100)
turnout        0.0288** -0.0344*** -0.0889*** -0.0687*** 0.0571 0.234***
               (0.0114) (0.0104) (0.0175) (0.0187) (0.0376) (0.0298)
enp            0.00557 0.00632 -0.103 -0.0849 -0.0449*** 0.0169
               (0.0367) (0.0325) (0.101) (0.100) (0.00925) (0.0305)
turnout        -0.0290 -0.0382 -0.208** -0.174* -0.664*** -0.0329
               (0.0344) (0.0306) (0.103) (0.103) (0.0794) (0.0716)
C_a            0.0611* 0.00404 0.119 0.105 0.163*** 0.106***
               (0.0367) (0.0325) (0.101) (0.100) (0.0158) (0.0275)
Obs (1)          10377 10032 10833 1774 1774 1791 4365 4365 4415
Table A.4.3
Coefficients of political competition variables. Dependent variable: Log of primary education gross rate, panel estimation (RE-PCSE)
BRAZIL COLOMBIA MEXICO (2)
(1) Median of observations  for all 9 regressions. (2) Log of years of education in population older than 5 years. Coefficients of fiscal and control variables 
are not reported. Basic controls: logarithm of: per capita gross domestic product or its proxy, population and demographic density. All density. All controls: 
basic controls plus population growth, index of human development and five clusters. The table reports panel corrected standard errors underneath 
coefficients. Statistical significance is conventionally noted: ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1 
Log C Basic All H&T Basic All H&T Basic All H&T
difrank2       0.0470*** 0.000525 0.0308*** -0.0461 -0.0116 0.0167 0.147*** 0 0.199***
               (0.00640) (0.00354) (0.00762) (0.0291) (0.0289) (0.0176) (0.00841) 0 (0.0187)
enp            -0.558*** -0.0828*** -0.488*** 0.106 -0.0183 -0.0511 -0.678*** -0.466*** -1.171***
               (0.0166) (0.0107) (0.0238) (0.0742) (0.0748) (0.0437) (0.0352) (0.0332) (0.0668)
turnout        -0.259*** 0.328*** 0.179** 0.392*** 0.213** -0.0954 1.732*** 1.356*** 3.037***
               (0.0645) (0.0388) (0.0783) (0.105) (0.107) (0.0896) (0.0941) (0.0863) (0.158)
pc_a           -0.0460*** -0.0135*** -0.0452*** 0.0178 0.000652 -0.0107* -0.0429*** -0.0282*** -0.0848***
               (0.00595) (0.00343) (0.00763) (0.0272) (0.0270) (0.00561) (0.00747) (0.00693) (0.0103)
C_a            -0.545*** -0.0545*** -0.448*** 0.221*** 0.0792 -0.0512 -0.321*** -0.185*** -0.505***
               (0.0177) (0.0106) (0.0232) (0.0625) (0.0648) (0.0372) (0.0296) (0.0265) (0.0684)
C_b            0 -0.0417*** -0.253*** 0.126** 0.0747 0.00263 0.213*** 0.199*** 0.345***
               (0.0123) (0.00668) (0.0135) (0.0508) (0.0504) (0.0303) (0.0137) (0.0125) (0.0297)
C_c            -0.389*** -0.0234*** -0.278*** 0.200*** 0.0640 -0.0318 -0.357*** -0.215*** -0.676***
               (0.0178) (0.00875) (0.0195) (0.0592) (0.0615) (0.0390) (0.0278) (0.0251) (0.0634)
enp            -0.561*** -0.0751*** 0.122 -0.00115 -0.530*** -0.345*** 4415
               (0.0166) (0.0107) (0.0745) (0.0757) (0.0367) (0.0341)
turnout        -0.310*** 0.306*** 0.401*** 0.213** 1.250*** 1.067***
               (0.0742) (0.0388) (0.105) (0.108) (0.0985) (0.0896)
enp            -0.208 -0.265* -0.293 -0.682 1.209*** 1.062***
               (0.198) (0.149) (0.562) (0.559) (0.103) (0.0985)
turnout        0.0237 0.129 -0.0169 -0.474 5.329*** 4.470***
               (0.180) (0.144) (0.568) (0.568) (0.247) (0.240)
C_a            -0.353* 0.190 0.416 0.682 -1.645*** -1.356***
               (0.198) (0.149) (0.559) (0.554) (0.0912) (0.0880)
Obs (1) 10374 10030 10829 1756 1756 1814 4392 4365 4415
(1) Median of observations  for all 9 regressions. Coefficients of fiscal and control variables are not reported. Basic controls: logarithm of: per capita gross 
domestic product or its proxy, population and demographic density. All controls: basic controls plus population growth, index of human development and five 
clusters. The table reports  panel corrected standard errors underneath coefficients. Statistical significance is conventionally 
Coefficients of political competition variables. Dependent variable: Log-odds ratio of infant mortality, panel estimation (RE-PCSE)
BRAZIL COLOMBIA MEXICO
Table A.4.4
Log C Basic All H&T Basic All H&T Basic All H&T
difrank2       0.0103*** -0.00112 0.00889*** 0.0128 0.0166** 0.0174** -0.00147 0.0192***
               (0.00197) (0.00189) (0.00163) (0.00792) (0.00780) (0.00766) (0.00332) (0.00362)
enp            -0.0303*** 0.0243*** -0.0495*** 0.00806 -0.00273 -0.0328 0.0175 -0.145***
               (0.00538) (0.00529) (0.00521) (0.0287) (0.0266) (0.0316) (0.0135) (0.0161)
turnout        -0.296*** -0.141*** -0.118*** -0.0595 -0.0762 0.00684 0.0873** 0.469***
               (0.0223) (0.0222) (0.0212) (0.0619) (0.0581) (0.112) (0.0362) (0.0383)
pc_a           0.00280 0.00718*** -0.00746*** 0.0168** 0.0155** -0.00171 0.00285 -0.0120
               (0.00208) (0.00200) (0.00211) (0.00661) (0.00765) (0.0113) (0.00286) (0.00860)
C_a            -0.0464*** 0.0141*** -0.0538*** -0.00465 -0.0163 -0.0331 0.0244** -0.0167
               (0.00521) (0.00526) (0.00507) (0.0298) (0.0273) (0.0322) (0.0112) (0.0149)
C_b            -0.0255*** 0.00741** 0.00475 0.000333 -0.00331 -0.0166 0.0109** 0.0577***
               (0.00355) (0.00353) (0.00296) (0.0239) (0.0226) (0.0257) (0.00544) (0.00506)
C_c            -0.0418*** 0.00783 -0.0477*** -0.00666 -0.0180 -0.0370 0.0205** -0.0541***
               (0.00488) (0.00483) (0.00470) (0.0295) (0.0275) (0.0320) (0.0103) (0.0148)
enp            -0.0274*** 0.0225*** 0.00580 -0.00802 0.0309**
               (0.00532) (0.00530) (0.0296) (0.0274) (0.0143)
turnout        -0.292*** -0.137*** -0.0584 -0.0792 0.114***
               (0.0223) (0.0222) (0.0636) (0.0603) (0.0391)
enp            0.464*** 0.299*** 0.483 0.415 0.0894**
               (0.0858) (0.0836) (0.457) (0.497) (0.0352)
turnout        0.152* 0.111 0.400 0.322 0.251***
               (0.0818) (0.0794) (0.434) (0.462) (0.0843)
C_a            -0.491*** -0.277*** -0.477 -0.423 -0.0553*
               (0.0857) (0.0837) (0.456) (0.495) (0.0304)
Obs (1)          10915 10915 11045 94 94 94 4392
Table A.4.5
(1) Median of observations  for all 9 regressions. Coefficients of fiscal and control variables are not reported. Basic controls: logarithm of: per capita gross 
domestic product or its proxy, population and demographic density. All density. All controls: basic controls plus population growth, index of human 
development and five clusters. The table reports panel corrected standard errors underneath coefficients. Statistical significance is conventionally noted: 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1 
Coefficients of political competition variables. Dependent variable: Log of student-teacher ratio in primary education, panel estimation (RE-
BRAZIL COLOMBIA MEXICO
Political 
competition 
variable Log F Basic All Basic All 
Political 
competition 
variable Log F Basic All Basic All Basic All 
A_P          -.0476* 1.5e-04 .949*** .459*** A_P          1.86*** -.102 -.0988*** -.0071 .455*** .199***
               0.0267 0.0467 0.041 0.0442                0.148 0.087 0.0305 0.0499 0.0339 0.0387
A5_A1        -.235 -.239 .452 -.759*** A5_A1        -.513** -.919*** -.447* -.44 .167 -.516**
               0.201 0.202 0.299 0.262                0.251 0.199 0.271 0.273 0.241 0.236
A1112_A11    -.0325 -.0421 -.667*** -.393*** A1112_A11    -.114*** -.0425*** -.001 -.0179 -.332*** -.168*
               0.0497 0.0502 0.0978 0.09                0.0207 0.0162 0.0586 0.0585 0.0896 0.0891
A_P          -.0474* .0024 .803*** .439*** A_P          1.69*** -.106 -.103*** -.0047 .398*** .204***
               0.0266 0.046 0.0395 0.042                0.144 0.087 0.03 0.0493 0.0336 0.0381
A5_A1        -.233 -.235 .192 -.803*** A5_A1        -.538** -.917*** -.45* -.44 -.0285 -.609***
               0.201 0.202 0.291 0.262                0.246 0.202 0.271 0.273 0.235 0.234
A1112_A11    -.0295 -.0388 -.504*** -.312*** A1112_A11    -.113*** -.0428*** .0045 -.0126 -.266*** -.144
               0.0495 0.0501 0.0954 0.089                0.0205 0.0162 0.0584 0.0583 0.09 0.0896
A_P          -.0502* .0027 .588*** .428*** A_P          1.87*** -.114 -.0894*** -9.4e-04 .295*** .207***
               0.0261 0.046 0.0353 0.039                0.145 0.0885 0.0305 0.049 0.0356 0.0388
A5_A1        -.214 -.209 -.976*** -1.28*** A5_A1        -.479* -.908*** -.429 -.412 -.641*** -.853***
               0.2 0.201 0.263 0.257                0.253 0.198 0.271 0.274 0.236 0.235
A1112_A11    -.0345 -.0448 -.405*** -.323*** A1112_A11    -.113*** -.0404** .0018 -.015 -.224** -.161*
               0.0503 0.051 0.0858 0.0834                0.0206 0.0161 0.0594 0.0596 0.0874 0.0877
A_P          -.103** -.0407 .781*** .263*** A_P          1.78*** -.252 -.152*** -.0265 .391*** .0673
               0.0462 0.0782 0.0712 0.0633                0.139 0.173 0.054 0.0897 0.0616 0.0601
A5_A1        -.0959 -.159 .0386 -.995*** A5_A1        -.361 -.587** -.0936 -.176 -.311 -.961***
               0.275 0.277 0.326 0.277                0.305 0.28 0.397 0.399 0.328 0.336
A1112_A11    -.0255 -.075 -.489*** -.146 A1112_A11    -.071 -.0374 .0016 -.0871 .116 .339**
               0.105 0.102 0.179 0.141                0.0451 0.0414 0.121 0.124 0.158 0.149
A_P          -.0547** 8.3e-04 1.04*** .485*** A_P          1.67*** -.107 -.107*** -.0056 .525*** .224***
               0.0275 0.0464 0.0411 0.0455                0.143 0.0866 0.0314 0.0496 0.0341 0.0386
A5_A1        -.23 -.229 .33 -.862*** A5_A1        -.543** -.928*** -.438 -.424 .0845 -.613***
               0.2 0.201 0.305 0.265                0.247 0.202 0.271 0.273 0.245 0.238
A1112_A11    -.0315 -.0421 -.767*** -.434*** A1112_A11    -.111*** -.0429*** 8.3e-04 -.0175 -.412*** -.207**
               0.0495 0.0502 0.0995 0.0908                0.0204 0.0162 0.0585 0.0585 0.091 0.0899
A_P          -.0417 .0052 .798*** .428*** A_P          1.69*** -.105 -.0901*** .0019 .419*** .21***
               0.0255 0.0451 0.0396 0.0425                0.145 0.0877 0.0287 0.0486 0.0351 0.039
A5_A1        -.224 -.224 -.44 -1.19*** A5_A1        -.588** -.916*** -.429 -.415 -.301 -.777***
               0.2 0.202 0.29 0.262                0.25 0.204 0.271 0.274 0.24 0.236
A1112_A11    -.0323 -.0414 -.619*** -.403*** A1112_A11    -.116*** -.0449*** -.0032 -.0201 -.352*** -.208**
               0.0502 0.0507 0.0927 0.0859                0.0205 0.0163 0.0594 0.0594 0.0883 0.0883
A_P          -.0529* .0011 .958*** .461*** A_P          1.73*** -.0901 -.106*** -.0055 .493*** .222***
               0.0279 0.0464 0.0418 0.0447                0.148 0.0859 0.0318 0.0497 0.0348 0.0386
A5_A1        -.228 -.228 .328 -.866*** A5_A1        -.505** -.893*** -.436 -.422 .0517 -.645***
               0.2 0.201 0.305 0.266                0.249 0.201 0.271 0.273 0.242 0.237
A1112_A11    -.0322 -.0429 -.726*** -.418*** A1112_A11    -.113*** -.0441*** -4.1e-04 -.019 -.399*** -.211**
               0.0496 0.0503 0.099 0.09                0.0205 0.0162 0.0587 0.0587 0.091 0.0899
A_P          -.0557** 9.0e-04 .54*** .403*** A_P          1.68*** -.114 -.103*** -.0052 .264*** .188***
               0.0277 0.0464 0.0355 0.0386                0.142 0.0875 0.0319 0.0495 0.035 0.0381
A5_A1        -.222 -.219 -.85*** -1.16*** A5_A1        -.531** -.92*** -.449* -.436 -.563** -.776***
               0.2 0.201 0.257 0.251                0.247 0.199 0.271 0.274 0.234 0.234
A1112_A11    -.0335 -.0445 -.332*** -.258*** A1112_A11    -.111*** -.0411** .0043 -.0143 -.18** -.121
               0.0499 0.0507 0.0873 0.0851                0.0204 0.0161 0.0589 0.059 0.0877 0.0882
A_P          -.0526* .0012 .316*** .257*** A_P          1.68*** -.113 -.1*** -.0049 .112*** .0952**
               0.0277 0.0463 0.0415 0.0417                0.142 0.0875 0.0319 0.0495 0.0366 0.0386
A5_A1        -.226 -.224 -1.01*** -1.19*** A5_A1        -.536** -.929*** -.453* -.439 -.68*** -.804***
               0.199 0.201 0.242 0.24                0.248 0.199 0.27 0.273 0.222 0.225
A1112_A11    -.0315 -.0421 -.243*** -.194** A1112_A11    -.111*** -.0407** .0062 -.0122 -.122 -.0807
               0.0499 0.0507 0.0838 0.0822                0.0204 0.0161 0.0588 0.059 0.0864 0.087
1756 1756 4388 4361 10367 10024 1756 1756 4368 4341
(1) Median of observations for all 9 regressions. Coefficients of control variables are not reported. 
Basic controls: logarithm of: per capita gross domestic product or its proxy, population and 
demographic density. All controls: basic controls plus population growth, index of human 
development and five clusters. The table reports Huber-White standard errors underneath coefficients. 
Statistical significance is conventionally noted: ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1 
(1) Median of observations for all 9 regressions. Coefficients of control variables are not reported. Basic controls: logarithm of: per capita 
gross domestic product or its proxy, population and demographic density. All controls: basic controls plus population growth, index of 
human development and five clusters. The table reports Huber-White standard underneath coefficients. Statistical significance is 
conventionally noted: ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1 
Obs (1) Obs (1)
enp, turnout, C_a enp, turnout, C_a
enp, turnout enp, turnout
C_c C_c
C_b C_b
C_a C_a
pc_a pc_a
enp enp
turnout turnout
difrank2 difrank2
COLOMBIA
Coefficients of fiscal variables. Dependent variable: Log-odds ratio of Sewage coverage, 
panel estimation fixed effects Coefficients of fiscal variables. Dependent variable: Log-odds ratio of Water coverage, panel estimation fixed effects 
Table A.5.2
COLOMBIA MEXICOMEXICO BRAZIL
Table A.5.1
Political 
competition 
variable Log F Basic All Basic All Basic All 
A_P          .18*** .0039 -.0047 -.0021 .112*** .0603***
               0.0149 0.0088 0.0073 0.0085 0.0041 0.0043
A5_A1        .052** .026 -5.4e-04 .0081 .117*** .0069
               0.0248 0.017 0.0311 0.0325 0.0264 0.0226
A1112_A11    -.0103*** -.0064*** -.0354*** -.0371*** -.0331*** -.0109
               0.0025 0.0021 0.0125 0.0125 0.0084 0.0075
A_P          .172*** .0043 -.0051 -.0025 .0952*** .059***
               0.015 0.0089 0.0072 0.0085 0.0038 0.004
A5_A1        .0499** .0257 -.0017 .0065 .0786*** -.006
               0.0242 0.0172 0.0308 0.0321 0.0243 0.0215
A1112_A11    -.0103*** -.0063*** -.0354*** -.0372*** -.0147* -.0011
               0.0025 0.0021 0.0124 0.0124 0.0078 0.0071
A_P          .18*** .0041 .0018 .0036 .0809*** .0613***
               0.0149 0.0088 0.0071 0.0082 0.0036 0.0039
A5_A1        .0524** .0244 -.0026 .0059 -.038* -.0608***
               0.0248 0.0171 0.0313 0.0329 0.0227 0.0218
A1112_A11    -.0103*** -.0063*** -.0335*** -.0355*** -.0129* -.0089
               0.0025 0.0021 0.0125 0.0125 0.0075 0.0072
A_P          .148*** -.0063 .0029 .0115 .0891*** .0426***
               0.0133 0.0149 0.0108 0.0108 0.0068 0.005
A5_A1        .039 .0149 -.0022 -.0073 .0411 -.0518**
               0.0288 0.0238 0.0371 0.0372 0.032 0.0242
A1112_A11    -.0139** -.0124*** -.0244 -.0225 -.0038 .0274***
               0.0055 0.0047 0.023 0.0226 0.0127 0.0101
A_P          .172*** .0044 -.0029 -9.7e-04 .121*** .0624***
               0.015 0.0088 0.0073 0.0086 0.0043 0.0044
A5_A1        .05** .0256 .002 .0102 .112*** -.0029
               0.0242 0.0172 0.031 0.0324 0.0274 0.0227
A1112_A11    -.0102*** -.0063*** -.0356*** -.0374*** -.0448*** -.0152*
               0.0024 0.0021 0.0125 0.0125 0.0089 0.0078
A_P          .171*** .0053 -.0023 4.1e-04 .0987*** .0592***
               0.0154 0.009 0.0073 0.0084 0.0039 0.004
A5_A1        .0475* .0278 .0024 .0105 .0066 -.0589**
               0.0245 0.0178 0.0311 0.0325 0.0261 0.0229
A1112_A11    -.0106*** -.0066*** -.0351*** -.0369*** -.0326*** -.016**
               0.0025 0.0021 0.0125 0.0125 0.0082 0.0074
A_P          .177*** .0048 -.0018 9.2e-05 .111*** .0598***
               0.0155 0.0091 0.0072 0.0084 0.0042 0.0043
A5_A1        .0523** .0274 .0026 .0107 .099*** -.012
               0.0252 0.0178 0.031 0.0325 0.0266 0.0225
A1112_A11    -.0104*** -.0066*** -.0355*** -.0373*** -.041*** -.0149*
               0.0025 0.0021 0.0125 0.0125 0.0087 0.0077
A_P          .172*** .0041 -.0022 -2.5e-04 .072*** .056***
               0.015 0.0088 0.0072 0.0085 0.0034 0.0037
A5_A1        .05** .0256 -.0076 7.2e-04 -.0144 -.0376*
               0.0242 0.0172 0.0309 0.0323 0.0213 0.0206
A1112_A11    -.0102*** -.0063*** -.0336*** -.0356*** 2.7e-04 .0035
               0.0025 0.0021 0.0123 0.0124 0.0071 0.0068
A_P          .172*** .0043 -.0017 4.5e-04 .0425*** .0354***
               0.015 0.0088 0.0072 0.0085 0.0038 0.0036
A5_A1        .0494** .0248 -.0083 -2.3e-04 -.0357** -.0416**
               0.0242 0.0172 0.0308 0.0323 0.0177 0.0177
A1112_A11    -.0102*** -.0062*** -.0329*** -.0349*** .012* .0126**
               0.0024 0.0021 0.0123 0.0123 0.0065 0.0064
10377 10032 1774 1774 4392 4365
(1) Median of observations for all 9 regressions. (2) Log of years of education in population older than 15 years. Coefficients of control 
variables are not reported. Basic controls: logarithm of: per capita gross domestic product or its proxy, population and demographic 
density. All controls: basic controls plus population growth, index of human development and five clusters. The table reports Huber-White 
standard errors underneath coefficients. Statistical significance is conventionally noted: ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1 
Obs (1)
enp, turnout, C_a
enp, turnout
C_c
C_b
pc_a
C_a
enp
turnout
difrank2
BRAZIL COLOMBIA MEXICO (2)
Table A.5.3
Coefficients of fiscal variables. Dependent variable: Log of Primary education gross rate , panel estimation fixed effects 
Political 
competition 
variable Log F Basic All Basic All Basic All 
Political 
competition 
variable Log F Basic All Basic All Basic All 
A_P          -1.53*** -.14*** -.0654*** -.0633*** -.431*** -.307*** A_P          -.0814*** .0357*** .0058 .0068 -.0572*** -.0274***
               0.109 0.027 0.0054 0.0066 0.0197 0.0241                0.0101 0.0112 0.0382 0.0292 0.0039 0.0041
A5_A1        -.354** -.142** -.0564*** -.0612*** -.14 .151 A5_A1        .0185 .029 -.13 -.0966 -.254*** -.187***
               0.153 0.0674 0.0174 0.0204 0.141 0.14                0.0227 0.02 0.0902 0.0724 0.0349 0.0339
A1112_A11    .0642*** .0209*** -1.4e-04 -5.0e-04 .336*** .272*** A1112_A11    .0205*** .0113*** -.0057 -.0337 .0612*** .0467***
               0.0112 0.0068 0.0093 0.0094 0.0481 0.0483                0.0022 0.002 0.0602 0.0507 0.0107 0.0104
A_P          -1.43*** -.14*** -.0641*** -.0624*** -.37*** -.303*** A_P          -.0755*** .0356*** .0031 .0064 -.0478*** -.0261***
               0.107 0.0272 0.0057 0.0069 0.0197 0.0236                0.0099 0.0111 0.0381 0.0286 0.0037 0.004
A5_A1        -.329** -.137** -.0559*** -.0604*** .0314 .223 A5_A1        .0186 .0289 -.158 -.117 -.236*** -.183***
               0.144 0.0674 0.0171 0.0199 0.135 0.137                0.0221 0.0199 0.0992 0.0757 0.0349 0.0341
A1112_A11    .0633*** .0209*** -.0023 -.0026 .268*** .228*** A1112_A11    .0197*** .0113*** -5.4e-04 -.0273 .0508*** .0411***
               0.011 0.0068 0.0094 0.0094 0.0465 0.0469                0.0022 0.002 0.0611 0.0514 0.0103 0.0102
A_P          -1.53*** -.141*** -.0556*** -.0537*** -.326*** -.313*** A_P          -.076*** .0377*** .0033 .0035 -.0379*** -.0267***
               0.109 0.0273 0.0052 0.0061 0.0192 0.0232                0.01 0.0112 0.0407 0.0308 0.0037 0.004
A5_A1        -.358** -.137** -.0718*** -.0783*** .47*** .486*** A5_A1        .0193 .0295 -.16 -.0941 -.169*** -.154***
               0.151 0.0671 0.019 0.0224 0.138 0.139                0.0228 0.02 0.112 0.0755 0.0332 0.033
A1112_A11    .0644*** .021*** 8.0e-04 9.3e-04 .274*** .268*** A1112_A11    .0208*** .0114*** .0011 -.0437 .0476*** .0439***
               0.0112 0.0068 0.0096 0.0096 0.0465 0.0471                0.0022 0.002 0.0746 0.0614 0.0099 0.01
A_P          -1.41*** -.207*** -.0768*** -.0745*** -.342*** -.215*** A_P          -.0701*** .0268* -.0302 .0082 -.0471*** -.0151**
               0.0582 0.0474 0.0061 0.007 0.0327 0.0344                0.012 0.015 0.0468 0.0512 0.0067 0.007
A5_A1        -.229 -.0851 -.018 -.0165 .166 .415** A5_A1        -.0123 -.0074 -.101 -.127 -.261*** -.2***
               0.176 0.0919 0.0174 0.0181 0.165 0.162                0.0287 0.0271 0.121 0.113 0.0553 0.0541
A1112_A11    .0605*** .031*** -.0024 -3.6e-04 .0851 6.9e-04 A1112_A11    .0148*** .0098** -.0636 -.0727 .116*** .0968***
               0.02 0.012 0.0185 0.0187 0.0869 0.0852                0.0044 0.0041 0.0661 0.0666 0.0278 0.0272
A_P          -1.44*** -.14*** -.057*** -.0555*** -.471*** -.316*** A_P          -.0726*** .0354*** .0033 .0058 -.0633*** -.0295***
               0.107 0.0272 0.0068 0.008 0.0201 0.0249                0.0098 0.011 0.0386 0.0288 0.0038 0.0042
A5_A1        -.332** -.137** -.059*** -.0641*** -.132 .199 A5_A1        .0192 .029 -.156 -.114 -.245*** -.179***
               0.146 0.0673 0.0179 0.021 0.146 0.142                0.022 0.0199 0.0965 0.0713 0.0356 0.0343
A1112_A11    .0627*** .0209*** -.0014 -.0016 .385*** .293*** A1112_A11    .0195*** .0113*** -7.7e-04 -.0301 .0682*** .05***
               0.011 0.0068 0.0092 0.0092 0.0491 0.0488                0.0022 0.002 0.061 0.051 0.0108 0.0105
A_P          -1.44*** -.158*** -.0718*** -.0698*** -.393*** -.307*** A_P          -.0846*** .0336*** .0024 .0094 -.0461*** -.0247***
               0.11 0.0283 0.0039 0.0046 0.0197 0.0233                0.0105 0.0108 0.0387 0.0295 0.0038 0.004
A5_A1        -.281* -.12* -.0653*** -.0699*** .303** .466*** A5_A1        .018 .0289 -.158 -.109 -.189*** -.152***
               0.146 0.0676 0.0192 0.0218 0.147 0.144                0.0227 0.0198 0.103 0.0714 0.0347 0.0336
A1112_A11    .0644*** .0212*** -.0019 -.0022 .347*** .303*** A1112_A11    .0207*** .0109*** -2.9e-04 -.0307 .0577*** .0474***
               0.011 0.0068 0.0104 0.0104 0.0481 0.0483                0.0022 0.002 0.0635 0.0507 0.0106 0.0104
A_P          -1.49*** -.156*** -.0658*** -.0639*** -.431*** -.305*** A_P          -.0746*** .035*** .0032 .0057 -.0591*** -.0284***
               0.112 0.0279 0.0055 0.0067 0.0205 0.0246                0.0099 0.011 0.0386 0.0287 0.0039 0.0042
A5_A1        -.326** -.123* -.063*** -.0681*** -.0543 .251* A5_A1        .0175 .0284 -.157 -.118 -.244*** -.178***
               0.152 0.0678 0.0187 0.0219 0.144 0.141                0.0221 0.0199 0.0977 0.0724 0.0356 0.0342
A1112_A11    .0626*** .0204*** -6.8e-04 -9.9e-04 .374*** .294*** A1112_A11    .0197*** .0112*** 5.2e-05 -.0321 .0662*** .0494***
               0.011 0.0068 0.0093 0.0093 0.0484 0.0483                0.0022 0.002 0.0628 0.0518 0.0108 0.0105
A_P          -1.43*** -.141*** -.0512*** -.0495*** -.287*** -.289*** A_P          -.07*** .0367*** .0033 .0037 -.0339*** -.0243***
               0.108 0.0273 0.0062 0.0073 0.0194 0.0228                0.0097 0.0111 0.041 0.0308 0.0037 0.004
A5_A1        -.328** -.137** -.0627*** -.0689*** .365*** .372*** A5_A1        .0196 .0293 -.158 -.107 -.18*** -.164***
               0.144 0.0671 0.0165 0.0194 0.133 0.134                0.0222 0.02 0.11 0.0825 0.0336 0.0334
A1112_A11    .0634*** .021*** -8.6e-05 7.6e-06 .214*** .207*** A1112_A11    .0196*** .0114*** 2.6e-04 -.0378 .0418*** .0384***
               0.011 0.0068 0.0094 0.0095 0.0453 0.0459                0.0022 0.002 0.0725 0.0629 0.0098 0.0099
A_P          -1.43*** -.141*** -.0492*** -.0476*** -.15*** -.175*** A_P          -.0687*** .0363*** -.003 -.0017 -.028*** -.0212***
               0.108 0.0272 0.0061 0.0073 0.0227 0.0239                0.0096 0.0111 0.0424 0.0313 0.0043 0.0042
A5_A1        -.325** -.133** -.0622*** -.0681*** .463*** .394*** A5_A1        .0209 .0299 -.165 -.116 -.176*** -.164***
               0.144 0.0672 0.0164 0.0194 0.122 0.121                0.0221 0.02 0.111 0.0814 0.0338 0.0336
A1112_A11    .0633*** .0209*** 7.7e-04 8.7e-04 .16*** .157*** A1112_A11    .0195*** .0114*** -.0041 -.0396 .0395*** .037***
               0.011 0.0068 0.0095 0.0095 0.0428 0.0433                0.0022 0.002 0.0705 0.0607 0.0099 0.01
10374 10030 1792 1792 4392 4365 10915 10915 94 94 4392 4365Obs (1)
(1) Median of observations for all 9 regressions. Coefficients of control variables are not reported. Basic controls: logarithm of: 
per capita gross domestic product or its proxy, population and demographic density. All controls: basic controls plus population 
growth, index of human development and five clusters. The table reports Huber-White standard errors underneath coefficients. 
Statistical significance is conventionally noted: ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1 
(1) Median of observations for all 9 regressions. Coefficients of control variables are not reported. Basic controls: logarithm of: 
per capita gross domestic product or its proxy, population and demographic density. All controls: basic controls plus population 
growth, index of human development and five clusters. The table reports Huber-White standard errors underneath coefficients. 
Statistical significance is conventionally noted: ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1 
Obs (1)
enp, turnout
enp, turnout, C_a enp, turnout, C_a
enp, turnout
C_b
C_c C_c
C_b
pc_a pc_a
C_a C_a
enp enp
turnout turnout
BRAZIL COLOMBIA MEXICO
difrank2 difrank2
COLOMBIA MEXICO BRAZIL
Coefficients of fiscal variables. Dependent variable: Log-odds ratio of Infant Mortality , panel estimation fixed 
effects 
Coefficients of fiscal variables. Dependent variable: Log of Student-teacher ratio in primary education, panel 
estimation fixed effects 
Table A.5.4 Table A.5.5
Political 
competition 
variable Log F Basic All Basic All 
Political 
competition 
variable Log F Basic All Basic All Basic All 
A_P          0.0581 -0.343*** 0.224*** 0.131*** A_P          1.145*** -0.0750* 0.0207 -0.286*** 0.0685* 0.00713
               (0.0447) (0.0630) (0.0345) (0.0333)                (0.0516) (0.0406) (0.0400) (0.0571) (0.0403) (0.0407)
A5_A1        -1.171*** -0.858*** -0.510*** -0.359** A5_A1        0.459*** -0.255** -1.384*** -1.139*** -0.922*** -0.802***
               (0.162) (0.164) (0.165) (0.155)                (0.160) (0.120) (0.159) (0.159) (0.203) (0.196)
A1112_A11    -0.125** -0.107* -0.492*** -0.439*** A1112_A11    0.0253** 0.00597 0.116** 0.136*** 0.116 0.196*
               (0.0584) (0.0557) (0.0926) (0.0895)                (0.0124) (0.00879) (0.0473) (0.0454) (0.113) (0.114)
A_P          0.0564 -0.347*** 0.226*** 0.143*** A_P          1.013*** -0.0725* 0.0233 -0.285*** 0.0572 0.00553
               (0.0445) (0.0630) (0.0346) (0.0335)                (0.0500) (0.0405) (0.0400) (0.0571) (0.0400) (0.0405)
A5_A1        -1.171*** -0.862*** -0.581*** -0.404** A5_A1        0.276* -0.255** -1.377*** -1.138*** -1.001*** -0.858***
               (0.162) (0.164) (0.166) (0.158)                (0.160) (0.120) (0.159) (0.159) (0.203) (0.197)
A1112_A11    -0.125** -0.108* -0.489*** -0.461*** A1112_A11    0.0325*** 0.00577 0.117** 0.137*** 0.142 0.202*
               (0.0584) (0.0557) (0.0942) (0.0910)                (0.0120) (0.00879) (0.0473) (0.0454) (0.113) (0.114)
A_P          0.0575 -0.352*** 0.164*** 0.0920*** A_P          1.151*** -0.0594 0.0146 -0.279*** 0.0566 0.0144
               (0.0451) (0.0629) (0.0368) (0.0351)                (0.0511) (0.0405) (0.0391) (0.0572) (0.0410) (0.0412)
A5_A1        -1.175*** -0.890*** -0.804*** -0.539*** A5_A1        0.503*** -0.251** -1.312*** -1.113*** -1.012*** -0.797***
               (0.163) (0.165) (0.177) (0.159)                (0.157) (0.119) (0.158) (0.159) (0.208) (0.198)
A1112_A11    -0.124** -0.0928* -0.494*** -0.446*** A1112_A11    0.0149 0.00277 0.0941** 0.122*** 0.104 0.176
               (0.0590) (0.0563) (0.0945) (0.0916)                (0.0124) (0.00883) (0.0473) (0.0460) (0.113) (0.115)
A_P          0.0484 -0.448*** 0.310*** 0.211*** A_P          0.756*** -0.163*** 0.0314 -0.296*** 0.124** 0.0452
               (0.0612) (0.0894) (0.0455) (0.0444)                (0.0789) (0.0554) (0.0572) (0.0814) (0.0587) (0.0618)
A5_A1        -0.899*** -0.579*** -0.179 -0.207 A5_A1        0.0400 -0.247* -1.111*** -0.890*** -0.606** -0.686***
               (0.190) (0.192) (0.191) (0.171)                (0.200) (0.149) (0.189) (0.190) (0.261) (0.255)
A1112_A11    -0.157* -0.127* -0.531*** -0.308** A1112_A11    0.0378* -0.00923 0.124** 0.153*** 0.0306 0.193
               (0.0804) (0.0766) (0.127) (0.123)                (0.0198) (0.0149) (0.0579) (0.0572) (0.158) (0.160)
A_P          0.0584 -0.352*** 0.261*** 0.158*** A_P          1.016*** -0.0717* 0.00648 -0.282*** 0.0827** 0.0161
               (0.0451) (0.0629) (0.0341) (0.0332)                (0.0496) (0.0405) (0.0398) (0.0571) (0.0398) (0.0403)
A5_A1        -1.175*** -0.886*** -0.391** -0.305* A5_A1        0.280* -0.258** -1.329*** -1.128*** -0.842*** -0.790***
               (0.162) (0.164) (0.163) (0.156)                (0.159) (0.120) (0.158) (0.159) (0.197) (0.194)
A1112_A11    -0.124** -0.0945* -0.542*** -0.489*** A1112_A11    0.0256** 0.00596 0.104** 0.130*** 0.117 0.192*
               (0.0587) (0.0559) (0.0930) (0.0900)                (0.0119) (0.00878) (0.0473) (0.0459) (0.112) (0.113)
A_P          0.0563 -0.356*** 0.185*** 0.0814** A_P          0.971*** -0.0695* 0.0318 -0.278*** 0.0555 -0.00903
               (0.0444) (0.0627) (0.0361) (0.0349)                (0.0501) (0.0409) (0.0393) (0.0575) (0.0414) (0.0420)
A5_A1        -1.183*** -0.883*** -0.715*** -0.544*** A5_A1        0.260 -0.232* -1.348*** -1.123*** -1.004*** -0.866***
               (0.164) (0.165) (0.173) (0.157)                (0.160) (0.123) (0.159) (0.159) (0.208) (0.199)
A1112_A11    -0.121** -0.0974* -0.539*** -0.464*** A1112_A11    0.0230* 0.00686 0.105** 0.128*** 0.0887 0.184
               (0.0587) (0.0560) (0.0944) (0.0910)                (0.0120) (0.00882) (0.0474) (0.0458) (0.113) (0.114)
A_P          0.0593 -0.352*** 0.236*** 0.145*** A_P          1.058*** -0.0697* 0.00684 -0.283*** 0.0584 0.000517
               (0.0451) (0.0629) (0.0341) (0.0332)                (0.0510) (0.0410) (0.0398) (0.0571) (0.0402) (0.0406)
A5_A1        -1.176*** -0.885*** -0.501*** -0.372** A5_A1        0.388** -0.230* -1.334*** -1.130*** -0.960*** -0.870***
               (0.162) (0.164) (0.164) (0.157)                (0.162) (0.122) (0.158) (0.159) (0.198) (0.194)
A1112_A11    -0.124** -0.0940* -0.522*** -0.478*** A1112_A11    0.0251** 0.00689 0.105** 0.131*** 0.130 0.200*
               (0.0586) (0.0559) (0.0926) (0.0899)                (0.0121) (0.00882) (0.0474) (0.0459) (0.112) (0.113)
A_P          0.0573 -0.354*** 0.162*** 0.0931*** A_P          1.024*** -0.0595 0.00551 -0.279*** 0.0530 0.0155
               (0.0452) (0.0629) (0.0368) (0.0352)                (0.0497) (0.0405) (0.0396) (0.0572) (0.0412) (0.0413)
A5_A1        -1.174*** -0.892*** -0.819*** -0.571*** A5_A1        0.298* -0.250** -1.304*** -1.113*** -1.016*** -0.826***
               (0.163) (0.164) (0.172) (0.159)                (0.158) (0.119) (0.158) (0.159) (0.206) (0.198)
A1112_A11    -0.124** -0.0903 -0.447*** -0.427*** A1112_A11    0.0215* 0.00273 0.0936** 0.122*** 0.145 0.195*
               (0.0590) (0.0563) (0.0949) (0.0920)                (0.0120) (0.00883) (0.0473) (0.0461) (0.114) (0.115)
A_P          0.0548 -0.353*** -0.0603 -0.0801** A_P          1.025*** -0.0605 0.00670 -0.280*** -0.133*** -0.128***
               (0.0453) (0.0630) (0.0400) (0.0384)                (0.0497) (0.0405) (0.0397) (0.0572) (0.0470) (0.0471)
A5_A1        -1.183*** -0.898*** -1.330*** -1.006*** A5_A1        0.297* -0.250** -1.300*** -1.104*** -1.440*** -1.183***
               (0.163) (0.164) (0.177) (0.161)                (0.158) (0.119) (0.158) (0.159) (0.210) (0.201)
A1112_A11    -0.123** -0.0900 -0.273*** -0.308*** A1112_A11    0.0214* 0.00288 0.0931** 0.122*** 0.287** 0.291**
               (0.0591) (0.0563) (0.0929) (0.0906)                (0.0120) (0.00883) (0.0473) (0.0459) (0.113) (0.114)
1756 1756 4388 4361 10367 10024 1756 1756 4368 4341
Table A.6.1
Obs (1) Obs (1)
(1) Median of observations  for all 9 regressions. Coefficients of control variables are not 
reported. Basic controls: logarithm of: per capita gross domestic product or its proxy, 
population and demographic density. All controls: basic controls plus population growth, 
index of human development and five clusters. The table reports panel corrected standard 
errors underneath coefficients. Statistical significance is conventionally noted: ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1 
(1) Median of observations for all 9 regressions. Coefficients of control variables are not reported. Basic controls: logarithm of: 
per capita gross domestic product or its proxy, population and demographic density. All controls: basic controls plus 
population growth, index of human development and five clusters. The table reports panel corrected standard underneath 
coefficients. Statistical significance is conventionally noted: ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1 
enp, turnout enp, turnout
enp, turnout, C_a enp, turnout, C_a
C_b C_b
C_c C_c
pc_a pc_a
C_a C_a
enp enp
turnout turnout
difrank2 difrank2
COLOMBIA MEXICO BRAZIL COLOMBIA MEXICO
Coefficients of fiscal variables. Dependent variable: Log-odds ratio of Sewage coverage, panel 
estimation (RE-PCSE)
Table A.6.2
Coefficients of fiscal variables. Dependent variable: Log-odds ratio of Water coverage, panel estimation (RE-PCSE)
Political 
competition 
variable Log F Basic All Basic All Basic All 
A_P          0.122*** 0.0373*** 0.0146** 0.0118 0.0157*** -0.00445
               (0.00459) (0.00373) (0.00743) (0.00817) (0.00481) (0.00313)
A5_A1        0.101*** 0.0518*** -0.0891*** -0.161*** -0.118*** 0.00912
               (0.00928) (0.00733) (0.0326) (0.0364) (0.0219) (0.0148)
A1112_A11    -0.00756*** -0.00978*** -0.0230*** -0.0310*** -0.0425*** -0.00172
               (0.00110) (0.000946) (0.00813) (0.00811) (0.0116) (0.00801)
A_P          0.111*** 0.0375*** 0.0134* 0.0101 0.0115** -0.00527*
               (0.00442) (0.00373) (0.00743) (0.00819) (0.00470) (0.00311)
A5_A1        0.0854*** 0.0500*** -0.0876*** -0.161*** -0.143*** -0.00407
               (0.00895) (0.00730) (0.0323) (0.0362) (0.0212) (0.0148)
A1112_A11    -0.00696*** -0.00965*** -0.0230*** -0.0310*** -0.0332*** 0.000277
               (0.00107) (0.000946) (0.00814) (0.00812) (0.0114) (0.00801)
A_P          0.122*** 0.0360*** 0.0168** 0.0131 0.0164*** 0.00182
               (0.00458) (0.00373) (0.00730) (0.00799) (0.00512) (0.00321)
A5_A1        0.103*** 0.0512*** -0.106*** -0.161*** -0.123*** 0.0288*
               (0.00919) (0.00728) (0.0329) (0.0360) (0.0230) (0.0147)
A1112_A11    -0.00775*** -0.00945*** -0.0178** -0.0268*** -0.0516*** -0.00972
               (0.00110) (0.000949) (0.00820) (0.00817) (0.0117) (0.00802)
A_P          0.0810*** 0.0349*** 0.0116 0.00435 0.000423 -0.0143***
               (0.00628) (0.00522) (0.00988) (0.0107) (0.00588) (0.00419)
A5_A1        0.0462*** 0.0274*** -0.0637* -0.145*** -0.0834*** -0.0367**
               (0.0102) (0.00871) (0.0383) (0.0422) (0.0267) (0.0182)
A1112_A11    -0.00754*** -0.00985*** -0.0217** -0.0269*** -0.0598*** 0.0178
               (0.00162) (0.00150) (0.0103) (0.0104) (0.0156) (0.0115)
A_P          0.112*** 0.0378*** 0.0166** 0.0129 0.0185*** -0.00318
               (0.00442) (0.00374) (0.00745) (0.00817) (0.00462) (0.00306)
A5_A1        0.0869*** 0.0506*** -0.0932*** -0.161*** -0.0970*** 0.0107
               (0.00891) (0.00732) (0.0324) (0.0363) (0.0197) (0.0141)
A1112_A11    -0.00753*** -0.00976*** -0.0222*** -0.0307*** -0.0411*** -0.00190
               (0.00107) (0.000947) (0.00813) (0.00813) (0.0114) (0.00784)
A_P          0.109*** 0.0379*** 0.0141* 0.0117 0.0199*** -0.00281
               (0.00448) (0.00380) (0.00734) (0.00806) (0.00509) (0.00331)
A5_A1        0.0830*** 0.0501*** -0.0928*** -0.161*** -0.112*** 0.0121
               (0.00905) (0.00749) (0.0325) (0.0362) (0.0225) (0.0149)
A1112_A11    -0.00781*** -0.00982*** -0.0221*** -0.0306*** -0.0530*** -0.00619
               (0.00107) (0.000953) (0.00816) (0.00816) (0.0116) (0.00806)
A_P          0.115*** 0.0380*** 0.0168** 0.0132 0.0122*** -0.00590*
               (0.00456) (0.00381) (0.00745) (0.00819) (0.00464) (0.00310)
A5_A1        0.0931*** 0.0514*** -0.0932*** -0.161*** -0.128*** -0.00348
               (0.00917) (0.00750) (0.0324) (0.0363) (0.0205) (0.0146)
A1112_A11    -0.00765*** -0.00979*** -0.0221*** -0.0306*** -0.0382*** -0.00101
               (0.00108) (0.000953) (0.00812) (0.00812) (0.0114) (0.00790)
A_P          0.111*** 0.0363*** 0.0155** 0.0113 0.0163*** 0.00219
               (0.00442) (0.00374) (0.00745) (0.00819) (0.00489) (0.00315)
A5_A1        0.0859*** 0.0497*** -0.105*** -0.162*** -0.125*** 0.0212
               (0.00893) (0.00726) (0.0326) (0.0359) (0.0209) (0.0142)
A1112_A11    -0.00721*** -0.00936*** -0.0178** -0.0268*** -0.0363*** -0.00476
               (0.00107) (0.000949) (0.00822) (0.00819) (0.0114) (0.00790)
A_P          0.112*** 0.0363*** 0.0155** 0.0112 -0.0101* -0.00478
               (0.00443) (0.00374) (0.00745) (0.00819) (0.00525) (0.00358)
A5_A1        0.0858*** 0.0497*** -0.103*** -0.160*** -0.186*** 0.00370
               (0.00893) (0.00726) (0.0326) (0.0359) (0.0221) (0.0149)
A1112_A11    -0.00723*** -0.00936*** -0.0179** -0.0269*** -0.0158 -2.03e-07
               (0.00108) (0.000950) (0.00823) (0.00820) (0.0115) (0.00796)
10377 10032 1774 1774 4392 4365Obs (1)
(1) Median of N for all 9 regressions. (2) Log of years of education in population older than 15 years. Coefficients of control 
variables are not reported. Basic controls: logarithm of: per capita gross domestic product or its proxy, population and 
demographic density. All controls: basic controls plus population growth, index of human development and five clusters. The 
table reports panel corrected standard errors underneath coefficients. Statistical significance is conventionally noted: ***p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.1 
enp, turnout
enp, turnout, C_a
C_b
C_c
pc_a
C_a
enp
turnout
difrank2
BRAZIL COLOMBIA MEXICO (2)
Coefficients of fiscal variables. Dependent variable: Log of Primary education gross rate , panel estimation (RE-PCSE)
Table A.6.3
Political 
competition 
variable Log F Basic All Basic All Basic All 
Political 
competition 
variable Log F Basic All Basic All Basic All 
A_P          -0.882*** -0.150*** -0.0487*** -0.0181 -0.187*** A_P          -0.102*** -0.00560 -0.0339* -0.0276 -0.0702***
               (0.0289) (0.0132) (0.0164) (0.0163) (0.0109)                (0.00705) (0.00733) (0.0179) (0.0210) (0.00455)
A5_A1        -0.724*** -0.353*** 0.480*** 0.0597 -0.161*** A5_A1        -0.0468** 0.0310* 0.0362 0.0421 -0.0716***
               (0.0596) (0.0300) (0.0549) (0.0576) (0.0495)                (0.0192) (0.0171) (0.0272) (0.0382) (0.0230)
A1112_A11    0.0263*** 0.0417*** 0.00318 0.0113 0.207*** A1112_A11    0.000921 0.00200 -0.0456* -0.0447** -0.0165
               (0.00582) (0.00343) (0.0206) (0.0185) (0.0289)                (0.00172) (0.00163) (0.0236) (0.0224) (0.0132)
A_P          -0.791*** -0.151*** -0.0473*** -0.0170 -0.186*** -0.159*** A_P          -0.0991*** -0.00400 -0.0441** -0.0368* -0.0706***
               (0.0271) (0.0133) (0.0164) (0.0164) (0.0108) (0.0100)                (0.00703) (0.00733) (0.0179) (0.0217) (0.00453)
A5_A1        -0.596*** -0.341*** 0.473*** 0.0565 -0.114** -0.179*** A5_A1        -0.0447** 0.0291* 0.0182 0.0177 -0.0735***
               (0.0565) (0.0297) (0.0552) (0.0578) (0.0489) (0.0488)                (0.0192) (0.0170) (0.0272) (0.0401) (0.0231)
A1112_A11    0.0213*** 0.0408*** 0.00222 0.0107 0.200*** 0.175*** A1112_A11    0.000650 0.00238 -0.0508** -0.0510** -0.0153
               (0.00548) (0.00343) (0.0206) (0.0185) (0.0283) (0.0282)                (0.00172) (0.00163) (0.0225) (0.0216) (0.0131)
A_P          -0.881*** -0.138*** -0.0390** -0.0126 -0.147*** -0.124*** A_P          -0.0942*** -0.00837 -0.0424*** -0.0407** -0.0665***
               (0.0287) (0.0132) (0.0167) (0.0167) (0.0113) (0.0105)                (0.00696) (0.00733) (0.0158) (0.0203) (0.00479)
A5_A1        -0.742*** -0.349*** 0.453*** 0.0547 0.0302 -0.0850* A5_A1        -0.0439** 0.0320* 0.0155 0.0183 -0.0592**
               (0.0590) (0.0295) (0.0545) (0.0571) (0.0523) (0.0487)                (0.0183) (0.0170) (0.0279) (0.0408) (0.0237)
A1112_A11    0.0285*** 0.0389*** 0.0120 0.0173 0.201*** 0.166*** A1112_A11    0.00370** 0.00311* -0.0481** -0.0478** -0.0189
               (0.00587) (0.00343) (0.0206) (0.0188) (0.0284) (0.0282)                (0.00173) (0.00164) (0.0234) (0.0224) (0.0132)
A_P          -0.652*** -0.122*** -0.0578*** -0.0341 -0.188*** -0.155*** A_P          -0.110*** -0.0356*** -0.0716*** -0.0711*** -0.0803***
               (0.0432) (0.0166) (0.0219) (0.0221) (0.0151) (0.0142)                (0.00923) (0.00981) (0.0150) (0.0181) (0.00685)
A5_A1        -0.375*** -0.245*** 0.397*** 0.0832 -0.272*** -0.258*** A5_A1        -0.0585** 0.0102 0.0425 0.0465 -0.0322
               (0.0707) (0.0341) (0.0671) (0.0686) (0.0595) (0.0605)                (0.0234) (0.0209) (0.0323) (0.0430) (0.0317)
A1112_A11    0.0109 0.0384*** 0.0158 0.0251 0.169*** 0.0820* A1112_A11    -0.00351 -0.000969 -0.0402 -0.0415 -0.0267
               (0.00848) (0.00497) (0.0257) (0.0237) (0.0425) (0.0429)                (0.00248) (0.00245) (0.0265) (0.0261) (0.0182)
A_P          -0.799*** -0.152*** -0.0344** -0.00821 -0.208*** -0.171*** A_P          -0.0967*** -0.00449 -0.0416** -0.0353* -0.0703***
               (0.0272) (0.0133) (0.0168) (0.0170) (0.0110) (0.0101)                (0.00700) (0.00735) (0.0184) (0.0213) (0.00446)
A5_A1        -0.608*** -0.346*** 0.455*** 0.0569 -0.224*** -0.255*** A5_A1        -0.0413** 0.0298* 0.0220 0.0241 -0.0700***
               (0.0564) (0.0299) (0.0548) (0.0572) (0.0496) (0.0500)                (0.0192) (0.0171) (0.0264) (0.0401) (0.0231)
A1112_A11    0.0261*** 0.0416*** 0.00782 0.0149 0.234*** 0.198*** A1112_A11    0.000784 0.00209 -0.0501** -0.0497** -0.0153
               (0.00548) (0.00343) (0.0203) (0.0185) (0.0290) (0.0287)                (0.00171) (0.00163) (0.0232) (0.0223) (0.0131)
A_P          -0.775*** -0.153*** -0.0579*** -0.0257 -0.157*** -0.119*** A_P          -0.0972*** -0.00543 -0.0425*** -0.0377* -0.0671***
               (0.0272) (0.0135) (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0114) (0.0104)                (0.00700) (0.00733) (0.0158) (0.0204) (0.00476)
A5_A1        -0.584*** -0.351*** 0.457*** 0.0521 -0.0175 -0.0928* A5_A1        -0.0425** 0.0299* 0.0209 0.0174 -0.0612***
               (0.0572) (0.0303) (0.0550) (0.0579) (0.0509) (0.0476)                (0.0191) (0.0171) (0.0267) (0.0403) (0.0235)
A1112_A11    0.0280*** 0.0417*** 0.00908 0.0138 0.228*** 0.182*** A1112_A11    0.00147 0.00188 -0.0504** -0.0511** -0.0180
               (0.00546) (0.00343) (0.0205) (0.0186) (0.0285) (0.0278)                (0.00172) (0.00163) (0.0225) (0.0216) (0.0131)
A_P          -0.832*** -0.154*** -0.0430*** -0.0165 -0.196*** -0.164*** A_P          -0.0987*** -0.00487 -0.0412** -0.0353* -0.0709***
               (0.0285) (0.0135) (0.0162) (0.0162) (0.0109) (0.0101)                (0.00701) (0.00736) (0.0182) (0.0210) (0.00449)
A5_A1        -0.670*** -0.360*** 0.445*** 0.0543 -0.171*** -0.221*** A5_A1        -0.0432** 0.0304* 0.0229 0.0266 -0.0733***
               (0.0585) (0.0304) (0.0552) (0.0574) (0.0499) (0.0501)                (0.0192) (0.0171) (0.0268) (0.0409) (0.0231)
A1112_A11    0.0266*** 0.0416*** 0.00978 0.0153 0.226*** 0.194*** A1112_A11    0.000892 0.00203 -0.0498** -0.0492** -0.0151
               (0.00558) (0.00344) (0.0204) (0.0186) (0.0289) (0.0286)                (0.00172) (0.00163) (0.0234) (0.0224) (0.0131)
A_P          -0.794*** -0.140*** -0.0300* -0.00450 -0.145*** -0.125*** A_P          -0.0921*** -0.00658 -0.0436** -0.0395* -0.0669***
               (0.0272) (0.0132) (0.0170) (0.0172) (0.0111) (0.0104)                (0.00695) (0.00734) (0.0181) (0.0217) (0.00478)
A5_A1        -0.601*** -0.338*** 0.452*** 0.0579 0.0387 -0.0633 A5_A1        -0.0395** 0.0303* 0.0137 0.0219 -0.0597**
               (0.0564) (0.0292) (0.0544) (0.0569) (0.0503) (0.0483)                (0.0185) (0.0168) (0.0282) (0.0404) (0.0237)
A1112_A11    0.0239*** 0.0382*** 0.0109 0.0169 0.173*** 0.152*** A1112_A11    0.00321* 0.00345** -0.0484** -0.0471** -0.0177
               (0.00552) (0.00342) (0.0205) (0.0188) (0.0279) (0.0278)                (0.00172) (0.00164) (0.0235) (0.0228) (0.0132)
A_P          -0.794*** -0.139*** -0.0302* -0.00109 -0.0368*** -0.0357*** A_P          -0.0920*** -0.00780 -0.0467*** -0.0435** -0.0632***
               (0.0272) (0.0132) (0.0171) (0.0172) (0.0118) (0.0113)                (0.00692) (0.00735) (0.0176) (0.0222) (0.00513)
A5_A1        -0.601*** -0.338*** 0.451*** 0.0614 0.287*** 0.161*** A5_A1        -0.0402** 0.0297* 0.0144 0.0242 -0.0513**
               (0.0564) (0.0292) (0.0552) (0.0570) (0.0527) (0.0492)                (0.0184) (0.0168) (0.0278) (0.0408) (0.0243)
A1112_A11    0.0241*** 0.0381*** 0.0109 0.0163 0.0893*** 0.0915*** A1112_A11    0.00366** 0.00370** -0.0546** -0.0523** -0.0206
               (0.00552) (0.00342) (0.0205) (0.0188) (0.0265) (0.0265)                (0.00172) (0.00164) (0.0234) (0.0223) (0.0133)
10374 10030 1792 1792 4392 4365 10915 10915 94 94 4392Obs (1) Obs (1)
(1) Median of observatiosn for all 9 regressions. Coefficients of control variables are not reported. Basic controls: logarithm 
of: per capita gross domestic product or its proxy, population and demographic density. All controls: basic controls plus 
population growth, index of human development and five clusters. The table reports panel corrected standard errors underneath 
coefficients. Statistical significance is conventionally noted: ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1 
(1) Median of observations for all 9 regressions. Coefficients of control variables are not reported. Basic controls: logarithm 
of: per capita gross domestic product or its proxy, population and demographic density. All controls: basic controls plus 
population growth, index of human development and five clusters. The table reports panel corrected standard errors underneath 
coefficients. Statistical significance is conventionally noted: ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1 
enp, turnout enp, turnout
enp, turnout, C_a enp, turnout, C_a
C_b C_b
C_c C_c
pc_a pc_a
C_a C_a
enp enp
turnout turnout
COLOMBIA MEXICO
difrank2 difrank2
COLOMBIA MEXICO BRAZILBRAZIL
Coefficients of fiscal variables. Dependent variable: Log of Student-teacher ratio in primary education, 
panel estimation (RE-PCSE)Coefficients of fiscal variables. Dependent variable: Log-odds ratio of Infant Mortality , panel estimation (RE-PCSE)
Table A.6.4 Table A.6.5
Indicator Sewer Water Cprim IM Student-teacher ratio
difrank2 (-) FE, RE-Basic, H&T (+) FE-All, (-) RE-Basic, H&T (+) FE-Basic, RE-Basic, H&T (+) FE-Basic, RE-Basic, H&T
enp (+) FE, RE-Basic, H&T (-) FE-All, (+) RE, H&T (-) FE-Basic, RE, , H&T (-) FE-Basic, RE-Basic, H&T
turnout (+) FE, RE, H&T (+) FE-All, RE-Basic, H&T,(-) RE-All (+) FE-Basic, RE-All, H&T (-) FE, RE, H&T
pc_a (+) FE, RE, H&T (-) FE-All, (+) RE-Basic (-) FE, RE, H&T (-) FE, H&T (+) RE-All
C_a (+) FE, RE-Basic, H&T (-) FE-All, (+) RE, H&T (-) FE-Basic, RE, H&T (-) FE, RE-Basic, H&T
C_b (+) FE, RE-Basic, H&T (+) RE, H&T (-) FE, RE, H&T (+) FE, RE-All (+) RE-Basic
C_c (+) FE, RE-Basic, H&T (-) FE-All, (+) RE, H&T (-) FE-Basic, RE, H&T (-) FE, RE-Basic, H&T
enp (+) FE, RE-Basic (-) FE-All (+) RE (-) FE-Basic, RE (-) FE-Basic, RE-Basic 
turnout (+) FE, RE (+) FE-All, RE-Basic, (-) RE-All (-) RE-Basic (+) RE-All (-) FE, RE
enp (-) FE-All (+) FE-All, RE-All (+) FE-Basic, RE 
turnout (+) FE (+) RE-Basic
C_a (+) FE-ALL, RE-Basic (-) FE, RE-Basic (-) FE-Basic, RE
Indicator Sewer Water Cprim IM Student-teacher ratio
difrank2 (-) FE, H&T (+) FE, H&T (+) RE-All, H&T
enp (+) FE (+) FE, RE-All, H&T (-) FE, H&T
turnout (-) RE-All (+) RE (-) FE, RE, H&T (-) FE, H&T, (+) RE
pc_a (+) FE, H&T (+) FE (-) FE, H&T (+) RE
C_a (-) RE-All (+) FE, RE-Basic (-) FE, H&T, (+) RE-Basic
C_b (-) RE-All (+) RE-Basic (+) RE-Basic
C_c (-) RE-All (+) FE, RE-Basic (-) RE-Basic (-) FE, H&T (+) RE-Basic
enp (-) RE-All (+) FE (+) FE (-) FE
turnout (-) RE-All (+) RE (-) FE, RE (-) FE (+) RE 
enp (-) FE (+) FE-All
turnout (-) FE, RE (-) FE (+) FE-All
C_a (+) FE (+) FE (-) FE-All
Indicator Sewer Water edu15 IM Student-teacher ratio
difrank2 (-) FE, RE, H&T (-) FE, RE, H&T (-) FE, RE, H&T (+) FE, RE-Basic, H&T (+) FE, H&T
enp (+) FE, RE, H&T (+) FE, RE, H&T (+) FE, RE, H&T (-) FE, RE, H&T (-) FE, H&T
turnout (-) FE, RE, H&T (-) FE, RE-Basic, H&T (-) FE, RE-Basic, H&T (+) FE, RE, H&T (+) FE, RE-Basic, H&T
pc_a (+) FE, RE-Basic, H&T (+) FE, H&T (+) FE, RE-Basic, H&T (-) FE, RE, H&T (-) FE
C_a (+) FE, RE, H&T (+) FE, RE, H&T (+) FE, RE, H&T (-) FE, RE, H&T (-) FE-All (+) RE-Basic
C_b (-) FE, RE, H&T (-) FE, RE, H&T (-) FE, RE-Basic, H&T (+) FE, RE, H&T (+) FE, RE-Basic, H&T
C_c (+) FE, RE, H&T (+) FE, RE, H&T (+) FE, RE, H&T (-) FE, RE, H&T (-) FE, H&T, (+) RE-Basic
enp (+) FE, RE (+) FE, RE  (+) FE, RE (-) FE, RE (-) FE (+) RE-Basic
turnout (-) FE , RE (-) FE (-) FE, RE-All (+) FE, RE (+) FE, RE-Basic
enp (-) FE, RE (-) FE, RE (-) FE, RE-Basic (+) FE, RE (+) RE-Basic
turnout (-) FE, RE (-) FE, RE (-) FE, RE-Basic (+) FE, RE (+) FE, RE-Basic
C_a (+) FE, RE (+) FE, RE (+) FE, RE (-) FE, RE (-) FE, RE-Basic
Table A.7.1
Brazil: Summary of results Tables A.3.1 to A.3.5 and A.4.1 to A.4.5
Table A.7.2
Colombia: Summary of results Tables A.3.1 to A.3.5 and A.4.1 to A.4.5
Table A.7.3
Mexico: Summary of results Tables A.3.1 to A.3.5 and A.4.1 to A.4.5
Fiscal Variable Sewerage Water Cprim IM Student-teacher ratio
Municipal revenue per 
capita (A_P) (+) FE-Basic, RE (+) FE-Basic, RE (-) FE, RE-Basic (-) FE-Basic, RE-Basic 
Total transfers/ current 
revenue (A5_A1) (-) FE, RE-All  (+) RE-Basic (+) FE-Basic, RE (-) FE, RE (-) RE
Urban property tax 
revenue/ tax revenue 
(A112)A11) (-) FE (+) RE-Basic (-) FE, RE (+) FE, RE (+) FE
Fiscal Variable Sewerage Water Cprim IM Student-teacher ratio
Municipal revenue per 
capita (A_P) (-) FE-Basic, RE-All (-) FE-Basic, RE-All (+) RE-Basic (-) FE, RE-Basic (-) RE
Total transfers/ current 
revenue (A5_A1) (-) RE (-) RE (-) RE (-) FE, (+) RE-Basic
Urban property tax 
revenue/ tax revenue 
(A112)A11) (-) RE (+) RE (-) FE, RE (-) RE
Fiscal Variable Sewerage Water edu15 IM Student-teacher ratio
Municipal revenue per 
capita (A_P) (+) FE, RE (+) FE, RE-Basic (+) FE, RE-Basic (-) FE, RE (-) FE, RE-Basic
Total transfers/ current 
revenue (A5_A1) (-) FE-All, RE (-) FE-All, RE (+) FE-Basic(-) RE-Basic (+) FE-All, (-) RE (-) FE, RE-Basic
Urban property tax 
revenue/ tax revenue 
(A112)A11) (-) FE, RE (-) FE (-) FE-Basic, RE-Basic (+) FE, RE (+) FE
Table A.8.1
Brazil: Summary of results Tables A.5.1 to A.5.5 and A.6.1 to A.6.5
Table A.8.2
Colombia: Summary of results Tables A.5.1 to A.5.5 and A.6.1 to A.6.5
Table A.8.3
Mexico: Summary of results Tables A.5.1 to A.5.5 and A.6.1 to A.6.5
Log of Population rank Coefficient n Coefficient n Log of Population rank Coefficient n Coefficient n Coefficient n
0-10,000 (0.012) 635 -0.21*** 1923 0-10,000 -0.042 4595 0.003 635 -0.183*** 1904
10,000-30,000 (-0.039) 724 -0.284*** 1349 10,000-30,000 -0.022 3605 -0.046 724 -0.201*** 1349
30,000-50,000 (0.031) 183 -0.245*** 442 30,000-50,000 -0.029 769 -0.041 183 -0.22*** 442
50,000-250,000 (-0.105) 166 -0.118** 546 50,000-250,000 -0.029 882 0.013 166 -0.175*** 546
>250,000 (-0.343) 48 -0.002 127 >250,000 -0.155* 172 -0.314 48 0.008 127
0-10,000 (-0.033) 635 1.544*** 1924 0-10,000 0.209** 4596 0.025 635 1.009*** 1904
10,000-30,000 (0.064) 724 2.199*** 1349 10,000-30,000 0.023 3605 0.088 724 0.979*** 1349
30,000-50,000 (0.204) 183 2*** 442 30,000-50,000 0.315** 769 0.527*** 183 0.907*** 442
50,000-250,000 (0.48)** 166 1.553*** 546 50,000-250,000 -0.018 882 0.215 166 1.223*** 546
>250,000 (0.472) 48 0.147 127 >250,000 0.404 172 0.539 48 0.057 127
0-10,000 (0.242) 635 -7.029*** 1925 0-10,000 1.071*** 4596 -0.04 635 -4.017*** 1905
10,000-30,000 (0.057) 724 -7.179*** 1351 10,000-30,000 1.565*** 3605 -0.003 724 -3.767*** 1351
30,000-50,000 (0.789)* 183 -7.291*** 443 30,000-50,000 1.689*** 769 1.1* 183 -3.428*** 443
50,000-250,000 (-0.721) 166 -6.499*** 547 50,000-250,000 0.857* 882 -0.659 166 -4.261*** 547
>250,000 (-0.218) 48 -5.924*** 127 >250,000 4.057*** 172 1.477 48 -4.624*** 127
0-10,000 (-0.004) 344 0.094 626 0-10,000 0.039 1892 0.004 344 0.079 620
10,000-30,000 (0.06)* 440 0.218*** 679 10,000-30,000 -0.003 1814 0.069 440 0.14*** 679
30,000-50,000 (0.098) 129 0.17*** 253 30,000-50,000 0.104* 459 0.16 129 0.067 253
50,000-250,000 (0.164)** 122 0.122** 383 50,000-250,000 0.041 575 0.119 122 0.099* 383
>250,000 (0.2) 45 0.013 95 >250,000 0.159 156 0.261 45 0.164 95
0-10,000 (0.03) 635 0.29 1924 0-10,000 0.299*** 4596 0.02 635 0.357** 1904
10,000-30,000 (0.063) 724 0.485*** 1349 10,000-30,000 0.159* 3605 0.062 724 0.142 1349
30,000-50,000 (0.299)* 183 0.523* 442 30,000-50,000 0.407*** 769 0.585*** 183 0.371 442
50,000-250,000 (0.331) 166 -0.28 546 50,000-250,000 0.033 882 0.091 166 -0.138 546
>250,000 (0.438) 48 -1.259* 127 >250,000 0.581* 172 0.574 48 -1.324** 127
0-10,000 (0.061) 635 -0.601*** 1924 0-10,000 0.042 4397 0.068 635 -0.313*** 1904
10,000-30,000 (-0.007) 724 -0.679*** 1349 10,000-30,000 0.094* 3513 0.025 724 -0.322*** 1349
30,000-50,000 (0.127) 183 -0.619*** 442 30,000-50,000 0.092 753 0.136 183 -0.19** 442
50,000-250,000 (0.177) 166 -0.55*** 546 50,000-250,000 0 870 0.08 166 -0.343*** 546
>250,000 (0.202) 48 -0.429* 127 >250,000 0.534** 172 0.063 48 -0.435** 127
Coefficients of control variables are not reported. Basic controls: logarithm of: per capita gross 
domestic product or its proxy, population and demographic density. Statistical significance is 
conventionally noted: ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1
Coefficients of control variables are not reported. Basic controls: logarithm of: per capita gross domestic product or its 
proxy, population and demographic density. Statistical significance is conventionally noted: ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1 
C_a C_a
C_b C_b
turnout turnout
pc_a pc_a
difrank2 difrank2
enp enp
COLOMBIA MEXICO BRAZIL COLOMBIA MEXICO
Table A.9.1 Table A.9.2
Coefficients of political variables. Dependent variable: Log-odds ratio of Sewage coverage, 
panel estimation (fixed effects) Coefficients of political variables. Dependent variable: Log-odds ratio of Water coverage, panel estimation (fixed effects) 
Log of Population rank Coefficient n Coefficient n Coefficient n
0-10,000 0.006** 4603 -0.01** 648 -0.037*** 1927
10,000-30,000 0 3605 -0.003 730 -0.043*** 1349
30,000-50,000 0.012*** 769 0.014 181 -0.029*** 442
50,000-250,000 0.004 882 -0.001 166 -0.017*** 546
>250,000 0.003 172 -0.006 48 -0.01 127
0-10,000 -0.024*** 4604 0.04 648 0.207*** 1928
10,000-30,000 -0.013 3605 0.009 730 0.297*** 1349
30,000-50,000 -0.041*** 769 -0.071** 182 0.285*** 442
50,000-250,000 -0.009 882 -0.008 166 0.191*** 546
>250,000 0.019 172 -0.055 48 0.076** 127
0-10,000 0.033 4604 -0.059* 648 -0.748*** 1929
10,000-30,000 0.112*** 3605 -0.031 730 -0.793*** 1351
30,000-50,000 0.201*** 769 -0.175 182 -0.889*** 443
50,000-250,000 -0.026 882 -0.203 166 -0.683*** 547
>250,000 0.069 172 -0.129 48 -0.579*** 127
0-10,000 -0.003 1899 -0.024** 366 0.009 626
10,000-30,000 -0.002 1814 0.003 428 0.023*** 679
30,000-50,000 -0.01** 459 -0.003 126 0.026*** 253
50,000-250,000 -0.005 575 0.023* 124 0.016*** 383
>250,000 -0.006 156 -0.021 45 0.018*** 95
0-10,000 -0.018** 4604 0.022 648 0.083*** 1928
10,000-30,000 -0.004 3605 0.002 730 0.115*** 1349
30,000-50,000 -0.025** 769 -0.076** 182 0.104*** 442
50,000-250,000 -0.012 882 -0.023 166 -0.002 546
>250,000 0.022 172 -0.048 48 -0.108*** 127
0-10,000 0 4405 -0.033* 648 -0.074*** 1928
10,000-30,000 -0.002 3513 0.002 730 -0.082*** 1349
30,000-50,000 0.001 753 -0.014 182 -0.078*** 442
50,000-250,000 0 870 -0.023 166 -0.065*** 546
>250,000 0.004 172 -0.029 48 -0.045*** 127
C_a
C_b
Coefficients of control variables are not reported. Basic controls: logarithm of: per capita gross domestic product or its proxy, 
population and demographic density. Statistical significance is conventionally noted: ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1 
enp
turnout
pc_a
difrank2
Table A.9.3
Coefficients of political competition variables. Dependent variable: Log of primary education (gross rate), panel estimation 
(fixed effects)
BRAZIL COLOMBIA MEXICO (1)
Log of Population rank Coefficient n Coefficient n Coefficient n Log of Population rank Coefficient n Coefficient n
0-10,000 -0.004 4603 0.009** 658 0.187*** 1927 0-10,000 0.001 5218 0.026*** 1927
10,000-30,000 0.003 3603 0.02 739 0.179*** 1349 10,000-30,000 0.004* 3830 0.011*** 1349
30,000-50,000 -0.002 769 0.017* 182 0.128*** 442 30,000-50,000 -0.007* 792 0.005 442
50,000-250,000 -0.046*** 882 0.016*** 165 0.084** 546 50,000-250,000 -0.002 902 0.009 546
>250,000 0.012 172 0.029** 48 0.085 127 >250,000 -0.002 172 0.005 127
0-10,000 -0.035 4604 -0.031*** 658 -0.918*** 1928 0-10,000 -0.013 5219 -0.123*** 1928
10,000-30,000 -0.007 3603 -0.06 739 -1.205*** 1349 10,000-30,000 -0.012 3830 -0.114*** 1349
30,000-50,000 0.028 769 -0.069** 182 -1.181*** 442 30,000-50,000 0.022 792 -0.127*** 442
50,000-250,000 0.061 882 -0.054*** 165 -0.659*** 546 50,000-250,000 0 902 -0.123*** 546
>250,000 0.064 172 -0.007 48 -0.222 127 >250,000 0.017 172 -0.186** 127
0-10,000 0.006 4604 -0.079*** 658 2.58*** 1929 0-10,000 -0.035 5219 0.307*** 1929
10,000-30,000 0.081 3603 -0.086*** 739 3.019*** 1351 10,000-30,000 -0.106*** 3830 0.401*** 1351
30,000-50,000 0.148 769 -0.119** 182 3.244*** 443 30,000-50,000 0.023 792 0.485*** 443
50,000-250,000 0.162 882 -0.151*** 165 2.993*** 547 50,000-250,000 -0.019 902 0.412*** 547
>250,000 -0.808** 172 -0.211** 48 2.698*** 127 >250,000 -0.102 172 0.533*** 127
0-10,000 -0.016 1899 -0.006 342 -0.066** 626 0-10,000 -0.005 2309 -0.012 626
10,000-30,000 -0.011 1814 -0.008* 423 -0.062** 679 10,000-30,000 -0.009** 2097 -0.008** 679
30,000-50,000 0.01 459 -0.007 119 -0.077*** 253 30,000-50,000 0.009* 504 -0.008* 253
50,000-250,000 -0.019 575 -0.01** 118 -0.043 383 50,000-250,000 -0.005 623 -0.014** 383
>250,000 0.014 156 0.019 42 -0.08** 95 >250,000 -0.011* 159 0.01 95
0-10,000 -0.037 4604 -0.033*** 658 -0.515*** 1928 0-10,000 -0.015* 5219 -0.061*** 1928
10,000-30,000 -0.003 3603 -0.058* 739 -0.54*** 1349 10,000-30,000 -0.018** 3830 0.001 1349
30,000-50,000 0.039 769 -0.067** 182 -0.604*** 442 30,000-50,000 0.021 792 -0.015 442
50,000-250,000 0.068* 882 -0.051*** 165 0.11 546 50,000-250,000 -0.002 902 0.018 546
>250,000 0.02 172 -0.016 48 0.603** 127 >250,000 0.016 172 -0.031 127
0-10,000 -0.025* 4405 -0.004 658 0.231*** 1928 0-10,000 0.014*** 5219 0.042*** 1928
10,000-30,000 -0.016 3511 0.016 739 0.338*** 1349 10,000-30,000 0.01** 3830 0.055*** 1349
30,000-50,000 -0.01 753 -0.044*** 182 0.337*** 442 30,000-50,000 0.032*** 792 0.058*** 442
50,000-250,000 -0.002 870 -0.026* 165 0.373*** 546 50,000-250,000 0.009 902 0.014 546
>250,000 -0.025 172 -0.023 48 0.398*** 127 >250,000 0.008 172 0.01 127
C_a
C_b
Coefficients of control variables are not reported. Basic controls: logarithm of: per capita 
gross domestic product or its proxy, population and demographic density. Statistical 
significance is conventionally noted: ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1 
enp
turnout
pc_a
difrank2
Coefficients of control variables are not reported. Basic controls: logarithm of: per capita gross domestic product or its 
proxy, population and demographic density. Statistical significance is conventionally noted: ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1 
Table A.9.5
Coefficients of political competition variables. Dependent variable: Log of student-teacher 
ratio in primary education, panel estimation (fixed effects)
BRAZIL MEXICO
C_a
C_b
turnout
pc_a
COLOMBIA MEXICO
difrank2
BRAZIL
enp
Table A.9.4
Coefficients of political variables. Dependent variable: Log-odds ratio of Infant mortality, panel estimation (fixed effects) 
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